



Police Department Performance and Management Review



FINAL REPORT

February 2012



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1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Introduction

In May of 2011, the City of Sunnyside released a Request for Qualifications and Proposals (RFQ/P) for a “Performance and Management Review” of the Sunnyside Police Department. MGT of America, Inc. (MGT) responded to the RFQ/P. After an oral phone presentation, MGT was selected by the city and approved by the Council. The contract between MGT and the City of Sunnyside was executed on August 23, 2011, and work on the project began in late September of the same year.

The MGT consultant team consisted of the partner-in-charge, Bob Lauder, project manager, Alan Pollock and MGT staff consultant Chad Lersch from MGT’s Austin, Texas, office and two independent consultants, both of whom have more than 30 years experience as police officers and commanders. Ron Glensor and Bruce Mills regularly team with MGT to conduct law enforcement reviews. Ron Glensor enjoyed a career of more than 35 years in law enforcement and retired as the assistant chief of police of the Reno, Nevada, Police Department. Bruce Mills also enjoyed a lengthy career in law enforcement and since his retirement as the assistant chief of police of the Austin, Texas, Police Department, Bruce has served the City of Austin in various capacities, including his tenure as the Chief of Austin’s Bergstrom International Airport and Director of the city’s Public Safety Department. Bob, Alan, and Chad have extensive experience conducting program evaluations, management reviews, and performance audits, with most of their experience focused on law enforcement and corrections departments throughout the United States. Our experience ranges from larger departments, including Austin, Texas and Miami, Florida, to smaller departments, such as Bonney Lake, Washington and Marion County, Oregon.

MGT relied on a rigorous project work plan to guide the project. The work plan served as a guide for the consultant team to help ensure the project remained on track. The project approach and methodology are more fully described in the next chapter of this report.

Background

The City of Sunnyside employs approximately 103 FTEs (full time equivalent employees) to provide all the normal and customary functions of a city government. Of the approximately 103 FTEs, the Sunnyside Police Department comprises more than half of the total city-wide FTEs at 54, not including the reserve unit. The department has experienced a significant growth in its overall personnel, with approximately 19 percent of its current FTEs hired on or after April 2010. The additional FTE, which include a crime analyst and nine patrol officers, were approved by the city at the behest of the department and in response to a significant increase in violent crime and gang activity in 2010.

EXHIBIT 1-1
Sunnyside, Washington, Crime Rate Per 10,000 Population
2009-2010

	2009	2010	% Change
Property Crime	568.8	473.3	-17%
Violent Crime	21.9	34.0	55%

Source: FBI Uniform Crime Report, 2011.


Of the 54 staff members, the authorized “commissioned” strength is 31 police officers, with the remainder being jail, dispatch, and other support staff, including limited jurisdiction hospital officers. Also included in the above personnel counts are the Traffic Safety Officer, HUD Officer, L.E.A.D. Detective, and School Resource Officers (SRO), each of which is partially or wholly subsidized by outside funding sources. The above numbers do not include the participants in the Explorers and Reserves programs. Police officers are represented by the Sunnyside Police Officers Guild, while the jail, dispatch, and support staff are represented by the Teamsters Local #760. The current contract for the Sunnyside Police Officers Guild is in effect until December 31, 2012, while the contract for the Teamsters Local #760 does not expire until December 31, 2014.

The Sunnyside Police Department provides patrol, investigations, dispatch services, a municipal jail (which also houses contract prisoners), school resource officers, and hospital security. Its current organizational structure, after completing its planned new officer hiring, can be found in **Exhibit 1-2**. The Sunnyside Police Department is a founding member of the local drug task force – Law Enforcement

1 Introduction and Background

Against Drugs (L.E.A.D.) and currently has one detective assigned to this function. Through its school resource officers and hospital officers, the department has developed strong partnerships with the Sunnyside School District and Sunnyside Hospital. In the past, the department had developed strong relationships with various community groups, including Sunnyside Promises; however, more recently the partnership with Sunnyside Promises has eroded. An organizational chart of the department is provided on the following page in **Exhibit 1-2**.

EXHIBIT 1-2
Sunnyside Police Department Organizational Structure
Current



Source: Sunnyside Police Department, September 2011.

1 Introduction and Background

The department has a 2011 adopted budget of \$5,740,105, which includes \$3,218,700 for general law enforcement, \$1,170,500 for operation of the city jail, and \$639,200 for dispatching services; with the balance consisting of various smaller funds maintained to assist the city with its law enforcement efforts. The adjusted appropriations for 2010 and 2009 were \$5,754,060 and \$5,233,220, respectively. The following chart, **Exhibit 1-3**, provides a breakdown of the 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011 budgets with respect to general law enforcement, city jail, and dispatch services.

EXHIBIT 1-3 Police Department Budget Detail 2009-2011

Year	Total Budget	Law Enforcement	% of Total Budget	Jail Operations	% of Total Budget	Dispatching Services	% of Total Budget
2008	\$ 4,610,461	\$ 2,459,964	53%	\$ 891,751	19%	\$ 562,612	12%
2009	\$ 4,666,052	\$ 2,526,073	54%	\$ 845,732	18%	\$ 598,155	13%
2010	\$ 5,328,687	\$ 3,035,826	57%	\$ 1,060,946	20%	\$ 577,234	11%
2011	\$ 5,740,105	\$ 3,218,700	56%	\$ 1,170,500	20%	\$ 639,200	11%

Source: City of Sunnyside, 2011.

Project Approach

Although this review closely followed MGT's standard approach for conducting such reviews, city officials suggested that certain specific areas be more closely reviewed. These areas include the department's organizational and management structure, current use of overtime, the existence and use of performance measures, and the department's overall accountability to city administration and its leaders. Consequently, MGT modified its approach to specifically address these issues.

Phase II of the proposed work plan required a review of the department's organizational structure and its use of resources, including personnel allocation. This was accomplished through two on-site visits to the department and a review of data, as provided by the city and department. Our initial week-long visit included four members of the consultant team and involved speaking to city administration and department management. In addition, several "ride-alongs" were conducted, and a comprehensive tour of the facilities was provided. From our initial visit and a review of the data, various issues were identified and documented. After which, a second visit by two consultants and follow-up requests for additional data helped to further clarify the strengths and weaknesses of the department. After our second visit,

numerous phone interviews were conducted to allow for a thorough understanding of the department, its organization and operations.

As a result of our on-site work and follow-up phone conversations, nearly every member of the department was interviewed. In addition, all city leadership and administration were interviewed. As the team began to formulate its findings and prepare recommendations, additional data requests were made and quickly answered by members of the department.

From the above work, a draft report was submitted to the City Manager and copies of the report were circulated among city and department leaders. After responses to the draft report were received, appropriate changes were made. A final report was then prepared and submitted.

The Report Structure

This report is organized into seven chapters. The first chapter includes an introduction, study background, general information concerning the department, and an account of the team's approach and methodology for the study. The third chapter provides the team's findings and the resulting recommendations concerning the department's overall management and organization. The fourth chapter is a review of the department's patrol function, while the fifth chapter looks at all support functions, including investigations, school resource officers, dispatch, and record keeping. The sixth chapter is a review of detentions.

Lastly, the consultant team thanks the City of Sunnyside for the opportunity to conduct this study. More specifically, the team thanks the Sunnyside Police Department for its assistance in organizing interviews and providing data, without which the success of this study and the resulting recommendations would not have been possible. In addition, the team thanks the City Manager, Mark Gervasi, the Chief of Police, Ed Radder, and Deputy Chief of Police, Phil Schenck, who provided clear direction and facilitated on-going communication with the team. The time, insight, and level of commitment provided by each of the above participants were invaluable to the successful completion of this study.

2 COMPARABLE AGENCY ANALYSES

Introduction

In partnership with the City of Sunnyside, MGT selected six comparable agencies from Washington State and other western states. The comparable agencies selected share common characteristics with present-day Sunnyside, including population sizes, crime rates, and current demographics, including income levels. MGT asked each comparison agency to complete an informational survey and all agencies responded to the survey, to some degree or another.

A major value of agency comparison is the ability to allow local leaders to evaluate Sunnyside's own practices against those of comparable agencies to gain a better understanding of Sunnyside's overall performance. Comparing the Sunnyside Police Department (SSPD) with similar agencies allows us to gauge whether its practices are shared by other like agencies, providing one measure of the effectiveness of such practices. It does not, of course, indicate that SSPD is necessarily wrong in approaching any issue or practice differently than its comparative agencies, nor does it suggest that Sunnyside should adjust its practices to reflect those agencies surveyed. Rather, it is meant to be a point of departure, by which open dialogue can occur in terms of the best organization and operational strategies for Sunnyside.

The data gathered in this survey can be useful, but it must be remembered that numbers do not reflect the specific community circumstances that affect each agency as it attempts to carry out its mission. Even so, the survey can suggest practices, policies, or staffing levels that may be appropriate for SSPD, and warrant further analysis.

In relation to its comparative agencies, Sunnyside spends significantly more per resident on its police force, while it falls below the median in calls for service in 2010. In addition, Sunnyside's population falls just short of the survey group average, while its number of patrol officers per 1,000 residents exceeds the survey group median and the number of non-sworn employees per 1,000 residents surpasses all agencies surveyed. However, not all cities had jails or provided dispatch services, which impacts that figure, and is further explained below.

Sunnyside exceeds most if not all of the agencies surveyed in terms of staffing, while its population is nearly equal to the average population of the sample group. Along with the lowest level of calls for service (of the agencies that reported this figure), it stands to reason with such high staffing figures that SSPD's overall cost per resident is higher than all of the agencies in the sample group. With the dramatic change in demographics, Sunnyside is a changing city, and with the change, comes growing pains. To ensure the best value to its citizens, the City of Sunnyside and SSPD must learn to closely monitor similar agencies to identify cost effective strategies, systems, and programs.

Methodology

The agencies surveyed for this review were those of:

- Red Bluff, CA
- Hermiston, OR
- Aberdeen City, WA
- Centralia, WA
- East Wenatchee, WA
- Ellensburg, WA

In considering demographic similarities, the following nine statistics were considered: recent population growth, per capita income, percentage of population in poverty, median age, percentage of labor force in managerial occupations, education level, percentage of population foreign born, average household size, and unemployment rate.

MGT developed a multipart selection process in order to identify peers geographically close to Sunnyside as well as West Coast peers that were similar in terms of size, demographics, crime rates, and reported gang issues. The peer group was designed to help assess Sunnyside's staffing, special units, and the way certain services (IT, automotive maintenance) were provided to the police department. The peer group was not designed to answer questions about compensation.

Once the sample group was identified, each was contacted by MGT and surveyed. The responses to the survey were entered into a master spreadsheet for further in-depth analysis, the results of which are discussed throughout this chapter.¹ To facilitate the graphical representation of our comparisons, the sample agencies are denoted as being either a Washington State agency or other as follows:

¹ A complete account of the survey results can be found in Appendix A of this report.



Findings

Sunnyside’s overall rankings amongst the survey group varied from category to category.

Exhibit 2-1 summarizes the results and provides an index to detailed exhibits for each factor analyzed.

The exhibits rank SSPD with the surveyed agencies in a number of areas, including:

- Population;
- Number of patrol officers per 1,000 residents;
- Number of non-sworn employees per 1,000 residents;
- Number of calls for service per 1,000 residents;
- Crime statistics;
- Cost per resident; and
- Special operations.

**EXHIBIT 2-1
Summary of Comparisons**


Exhibit Number	Factors for Comparison	SSPD Rank
Exhibit 2-2	Population	5 of 7
Exhibit 2-3	Sworn officers per 1,000 residents	1 of 7
Exhibit 2-4	Non-sworn employees per 1,000 residents	1 of 7
Exhibit 2-5	Non-sworn employees (excluding jail/dispatch) per 1,000 residents	5 of 7
Exhibit 2-6	Patrol officers per 1,000 residents	3 of 7
Exhibit 2-7	Ratio of patrol officers to sworn officers	6 of 7
Exhibit 2-8*	Calls for service per 1,000 residents	4 of 4
Exhibit 2-9	Budgeted dollars per resident vs. crimes per 1,000 resident	1 of 7 5 of 7
Exhibit 2-10	Budgeted dollars per resident vs. violent crimes per 1,000 residents	1 of 7 4 of 7
Exhibit 2-11	Law enforcement budget relative to city-wide budget	2 of 7
Exhibit 2-12*	Overtime expenditures vs. Crimes per 1,000 resident	4 of 4 5 of 7
Exhibit 2-13	Budget per resident vs. crime rate	8 of 16

Source: MGT of America, Inc., Comparable Agency Survey, 2011.

NOTE: Those exhibits with an asterisk (*) are results from which a full response was not possible.

Exhibit 2-2 reveals the population of each surveyed agencies service area.

**EXHIBIT 2-2
Population**



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2011.

Of the identified agencies, Sunnyside’s population is just short of the average; however, of the sample, four of the six agencies are larger than Sunnyside. This is significant in terms of overall budget comparisons, where the City of Sunnyside out paces all of the agencies surveyed.

The size of a department can be an indication of its effectiveness, but not necessarily an indication of its efficiency, as it is well understood that the increased number of officers, especially patrol officers, does not have a direct correlation with a decrease crime rate.² The next several exhibits look at the survey group’s staffing.


Exhibit 2-3 compares the agencies’ number of sworn, full-time employees per 1,000 residents. While these comparisons do not serve as conclusive evidence, a higher ratio of sworn officers per 1,000 residents may suggest more officers are per citizen, on average, allowing them more time to address problems and issues at the street level, conducting proactive law enforcement instead of reactive. One limitation of this comparison, however, is that it measures the total *number* of sworn personnel employed rather than the number of *hours* each is employed. Therefore, while a higher ratio of sworn personnel to residents *could* indicate better officer-to-resident coverage, more hours worked per FTE could bring about the same results.

² See George L. Kelling, et.al., *The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: A Summary Report*, Police Foundation, 1974.

2 Comparable Agency Analysis

For the seven comparable agencies, including Sunnyside, this ratio ranged from a high of 2.33 sworn officers per 1,000 residents (Sunnyside) to a low of 1.31 sworn officers per 1,000 residents (Hermiston, OR). Sunnyside maintains the highest ratio of sworn officers to 1,000 residents. With an average amongst the surveyed agencies, excluding Sunnyside, of 1.64 sworn officers per 1,000 residents, Sunnyside's 2.33 represents 42 percent more officers per 1,000 residents than the survey group average.


EXHIBIT 2-3
Sworn Officers per 1,000 Residents



Source: MGT of America, Inc, Comparable Agency Survey, 2011.

In addition to comparing the number of officer per 1,000 residents amongst the agencies, it is also helpful to look at the number of non-sworn or civilian employees within the agencies. Not only does this provide a more accurate understanding of the agencies size, it provides an idea of how efficiently a department might be allocating those tasks that can be done by someone other than sworn personnel. The ability to allocate these tasks often translates into savings for the agencies. **Exhibit 2-4** reveals that of the agencies surveyed, Sunnyside employs the highest number of civilians per 1,000 residents.

EXHIBIT 2-4
Non-sworn Employees per 1,000 Residents



Source: MGT of America, Inc., Comparable Agency Survey, 2011.

This figure includes staffing for the jail and dispatchers. However, Aberdeen City, is the only other comparison agency that staffs its own jail. Therefore, when comparing Sunnyside to its comparable agencies without including jail and dispatch staff, Sunnyside’s number of non-sworn employees to 1,000 residents drops far below the median. **Exhibit 2-5** provides an account of how Sunnyside compares to the survey group without jail and dispatch staffing.

EXHIBIT 2-5
Non-sworn Employees (excluding Jail/Dispatch Staff) per 1,000 Residents



Source: MGT of America, Inc., Comparable Agency Survey, 2011.

Without including jail and dispatch staff, Sunnyside ranks fifth out of the seven comparison cities in its employment of non-sworn personnel. Notwithstanding findings and recommendations in this report regarding the current workload of its sworn force, the ongoing use of overtime expenditures and the recent addition of several sworn personnel suggest that Sunnyside should further explore the trend of civilianizing more non-essential functions of the police department to accomplish its overall mission without the need for additional expenditures.

While the size of a department's sworn staff may serve as one indicator of a department's potential for being effective, a look at a department's "frontline," or patrol staffing, can provide a more accurate idea of the department's ability to curb crime. The *patrol officer* count, the number of officers whose primary duty is responding to calls, often serves as a better indicator of police visibility. For agencies such as Sunnyside, the ability to be visible is especially important, as one of Sunnyside's primary means in fighting the current gang issues is high visibility. The top-ranked agency in this category has the most patrol officers per 1,000 residents.

Exhibit 2-6 compares the surveyed agencies on their number of patrol officers per 1,000 residents. Of the seven agencies, Aberdeen City ranked highest with 1.48 patrol officers per 1,000, while Ellensburg was the lowest with 0.94. Sunnyside ranked a respectable third, with 1.20 patrol officers per 1,000 residents, somewhat higher than the group average, excluding Sunnyside, of 1.11.


**EXHIBIT 2-6
Patrol Officers per 1,000 Residents**



Source: MGT of America, Inc., Comparable Agency Survey, 2011.

With the highest number of sworn officers per 1,000 residents, and only the third highest ratio of patrol officers per 1,000 residents, Sunnyside’s ratio of patrol-to-sworn ranks at the bottom of the survey group, tying with Centralia. **Exhibit 2-7** reveals that despite a strategy of high visibility throughout the community, by comparison, Sunnyside employs a relatively small number of its total sworn officers as patrol officers.

**EXHIBIT 2-7
Ratio of Patrol Officers to Sworn Officers**



Source: MGT of America, Inc., Comparable Agency Survey, 2011.


While gathering staffing figures, the surveyed agencies were also asked of any minimum staffing policies currently implemented. For the purpose of this survey, a minimum staffing policy is a way by which an agency can ensure that a minimum number of patrol officers are on duty at any given time. If an agency falls below this minimum staffing, it typically uses overtime to backfill the vacancies. For example, at the time the survey was administered, Sunnyside, although no formal policy existed, required a minimum of two patrol officers plus a sergeant scheduled for a day shift and three patrol officers, plus a sergeant scheduled for a night shift. While each agency controls its staffing levels to ensure that its force remains effective and safe, the policies used to do so vary considerably.

When this survey was conducted, only two of the surveyed agencies reported a minimum staffing requirement. The two agencies were Centralia, and Ellensburg. Centralia reported a minimum of three at any time, except between the morning hours of 5:00 A.M. and 8:00 A.M. where the minimum was two; while Ellensburg reported a practice of three (including the sergeant), although its contract required a minimum of two officers at any given time. Therefore, with an informal policy of three by day and four at night, Sunnyside, is exceptional in its mandatory staffing figures amongst the survey group.

Mandatory minimum staffing is often a response to an increased demand on an agency. To get a sense of the demands placed upon a survey group, **Exhibit 2-8** compares agencies on the total number of calls for service per 1,000 residents, based on calls reported for calendar year 2010. Of the agencies that responded, Red Bluff was the highest with over 2,000 calls per 1,000 residents; whereas, Sunnyside was the least busy agency of those who reported with 767 calls for service per 1,000 residents.

In this category, the median number of calls for service was 1,263. With 767 calls for service per 1,000 residents, Sunnyside receives nearly 40 percent fewer calls than the median of the agencies that reported calls for service.

EXHIBIT 2-8
Calls for Service per 1,000 Residents, 2010




Source: MGT of America, Inc., Comparable Agency Survey, 2011.

In light of the current size of Sunnyside’s department, despite its relatively low volume of calls for service, **Exhibit 2-9** compares the agencies’ budgeted dollars per resident. As **Exhibit 2-2** illustrated, SSPD serves the fifth most populous city in the survey group with the largest annual budget at more than \$5 million, nearly \$1.5 million more than the group average, excluding Sunnyside.

SSPD spends more than \$336 per resident, exceeding the median cost per resident by more than 32 percent. SSPD spends more per resident than all other agencies in the survey group. Of the agencies spending less per resident, two of the five report lower crime rates, while Ellensburg, reports a comparable crime rate to Sunnyside. While spending per resident may be an element of lower crime rates, the data does not suggest a direct correlation that increased spending per citizen alone reduces crime rates.


EXHIBIT 2-9
Budgeted Dollars per Resident as Compared to Crimes per 1,000 Residents



Source: MGT of America, Inc., Comparable Agency Survey, 2011; FBI Uniform Crime Report, 2010.

Because SSPD relied on the spike in violent crime in 2010 as justification for the significant increase budgetary needs, **Exhibit 2-10** compares spending per resident to violent crime rates in 2010.

EXHIBIT 2-10
Budgeted Dollars per Resident as Compared to Violent Crimes per 1,000 Residents




Source: MGT of America, Inc., Comparable Agency Survey, 2011; FBI Uniform Crime Report, 2010.

As such, Sunnyside’s violent crime rate for 2010 was equal to the group median.

2 Comparable Agency Analysis

Sunnyside’s high cost of law enforcement relative to the survey group is also reflected in the size of SSPD’s budget relative to the city-wide budget for 2010. **Exhibit 2-11** reveals that with the exception of Red Bluff, SSPD maintains the largest budget in relation to the city-wide budget. At 38 percent, SSPD’s budget as it relates to the city-wide budget is more than 11 percent higher than the group median.


EXHIBIT 2-11
Law Enforcement Budget Relative to City-wide Budget



Source: MGT of America, Inc., Comparable Agency Survey, 2011.

Although it’s likely that there are many factors driving the size of Sunnyside’s budget, one of the obvious drivers is its overtime. Whereas, of the agencies reporting, SSPD’s overtime spending per 1,000 residents was nearly 100 percent more than its next closest agency within the survey group. Moreover, **Exhibit 2-12** reveals overtime expenditures per 1,000 residents at more than 500 percent more than either Hermiston or East Wenatchee.

EXHIBIT 2-12
Overtime Expenditures Relative to Crime per 1,000 Residents



Source: MGT of America, Inc., Comparable Agency Survey, 2011.

In addition to the above figures, **Exhibit 2-13** provides an account of the extent to which the survey group employs special units such as SWAT, and K-9. Within the survey group, Sunnyside’s special units are comparable to the agencies surveyed, with the exception of the Gang Task Force or Gang Unit recently created by Sunnyside. **Exhibit 2-13** also fails to reveal SSPD’s 97 bed jail facility owned and operated by Sunnyside that, with the exception of a small 18 bed facility in Aberdeen City, is exclusive to Sunnyside amongst the agencies surveyed.

**EXHIBIT 2-13
Special Operations Units**

City	K-9	SWAT	Gang Task Force	SRO	Other Special Units
Sunnyside, WA	Yes, 1 Officer	Yes, jointly with Grandview, WA	Gang Unit	Yes, 3 SRO's	HUD Officer
Red Bluff, CA	No	Yes, jointly with Sheriff and Corning PD-- Tehama County Interagency SWAT Team--5 members from Red Bluff	No	Yes, 1 SRO	N/A
Hermiston, OR	Not indicated	May 2011 news article said that Oregon State Police SWAT acted in Hermiston	Gang Enforcement Officer	Yes, 1 SRO	N/A
Aberdeen City, WA	Yes, 1 Officer	Yes	No	Yes	Drug Task Force
Centralia, WA	Yes, 2 Officer	Yes	No	Yes, 1 SRO	N/A
East Wenatchee, WA	Yes, # Officer not indicated	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A
Ellensburg, WA	Yes, 1 Officer	No, but has an emergency response team	No	Yes, 1 SRO and Reserve Officers	Anti-crime team (2 Detectives)

Source: MGT of America, Inc., Comparable Agency Survey, 2011.

3. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

Introduction

This chapter of the report presents the results of MGT's review on the Sunnyside Police Department's overall organization and management. This chapter also focuses on the overall organizational structure of the department's core functional areas and units of the department.

Background

MGT's review of the Sunnyside Police Department came at a time of significant concern about the department's leadership, the growing concern about gang-related violence in the community, and the economic and fiscal challenges facing the community.

The current chief of police, who started with the department in 1978 as a patrol officer, had been out on medical leave for several months requiring the deputy chief to assume the role of chief, while performing his deputy chief duties as well. City management was unsure how long the chief would be out on medical leave, which raised concerns within the department and among city government leaders.

Meanwhile, the city has been dealing with increased gang related criminal activity and developing and implementing strategies to curtail such activity, while reassuring citizens that adequate steps were being taken to address the problem. Additionally, the City of Sunnyside, like most communities around the country, was facing the fiscal stresses of a stagnant tax base, sluggish revenue streams and growing demand for city services. There was particular concern about the growth of the police department's budget.

Exhibit 3-1 displays budget information for the city's law enforcement function. Included in the exhibit are the general fund law enforcement budgets as well as the total city general fund budgets from 2007 to 2011.

EXHIBIT 3-1
Comparison of City and Law Enforcement
General Fund Budgets
2007 - 2011

Category	2007 Actual	2008 Actual	2009 Actual	2010 Actual	2011 Budget
Total City General Fund Budget	\$13,230,875	\$9,638,321	\$10,082,127	\$11,737,770	\$10,539,400
Percent Change From Previous Year	NA	-27.15%	4.60%	16.42%	-10.21%
Percent Change 2007 To 2011					-20.34%
Average Annual Change 2007 to 2011					-5.53%
Total Law Enforcement General Fund Budget	\$2,485,658	\$2,459,964	\$2,526,073	\$3,035,826	\$3,018,800
Percent Change From Previous Year	NA	-1.03%	2.69%	20.18%	-0.56%
Percent Change 2007 To 2011					21.45%
Average Annual Change 2007 to 2011					4.98%
Law Enforcement GF Budget as a % of City GF Budget	18.79%	25.52%	25.05%	25.86%	28.64%

Source: City of Sunnyside, Department of Finance, Budget vs. Actual History, November 15, 2011.

As the table above shows, the law enforcement general fund budget has grown by nearly 22 percent from 2007 to 2011, from \$2.48 million to \$3.02 million. During the same period the total city general fund budget actually declined by 20 percent, from \$13.23 million to \$10.54 million.

The law enforcement general fund budget represented 18.79 percent of the city’s total general fund budget in 2007 and grew to 28.64 percent in 2011, a significant increase given the total city general fund budget declined by 20 percent from 2007 to 2011.

Clearly, the general fund law enforcement budget has continued to represent a larger percentage of the city’s total general fund budget from 2007 to 2011. So, the concerns expressed by some city management staff and elected city leaders about the growth of the law enforcement budget are understandable.

Findings and Recommendations

FINDING

At the time of MGT's review, the Sunnyside Police Department was organized as shown in the exhibit on the following page, which was provided by the department to the consulting team. Please note that the organizational chart presented in **Exhibit 3-2** represents the department's organizational structure when fully staffed.

The department is currently composed of the following primary functional areas or divisions:

- Administration – this area is the top management of the department led by the chief of police and includes the deputy chief, an administrative assistant and a crime analyst. Administration is responsible for directing and coordinating all activities of the police department.
- Patrol – the patrol function is typically the most visible presence of any police department because of its regular interaction with the community. Patrol officers deliver the most traditional law enforcement services of the department by responding to such incidents (calls for service) as traffic accidents, assaults, burglaries, and many other situations.
- Investigations – the detectives in this area are responsible for investigating a wide range of crimes including crimes against persons, property crimes, auto thefts, and drug crimes, as well as gang related crimes, which is a current focus of the detectives in the department.
- SRO and HUD Officers – the department has a handful of officers dedicated to providing law enforcement services to the city’s schools and public housing properties. The SROs (school resource officers) focus on the law enforcement needs of the schools while the HUD officers (housing authority) focus on the law enforcement needs at public housing sites.
- Hospital Security Officers – the department provides security at the local hospital to help ensure that the staff, patients, visitors, hospital, and surrounding grounds are safe and secure.
- Corrections – the department is responsible for managing and running the city’s jail. The department runs a 97-bed facility that houses the city’s inmates as well as inmates from other jurisdictions that contract with the city to hold their prisoners.
- Dispatch – the department is also responsible for running the city’s communications center to answer all emergency and non-emergency calls from citizens. Dispatch also provides support to the jail and the courts in the Law and Justice Center.
- Support – there is an administrative support function within the department staffed by two receptionists, a traffic safety analyst, and a data entry specialist.
- Auxiliary Units – the department maintains a reserve officer corps where citizens can work with police officers on a volunteer basis after receiving the appropriate training. In addition, the department sponsors an Explorer post of volunteers between the ages of 14 and 21 who assist the department in a variety of ways.

The organizational chart provided by the department does not clearly delineate the primary organizational units of the department (e.g., patrol, investigations, corrections/detentions) or clearly indicate the reporting relationships of some units and individuals. Nonetheless, the chart shows a relatively linear or flat organizational structure with several direct reports to the deputy chief. In fact, under the current organizational structure there are as many as 16 direct reports to the deputy chief. (During interviews the

deputy chief suggested that he was responsible for too many direct reports.) The direct reports to the deputy chief under the current structure include:

- Patrol sergeants (4);
- SRO sergeant;
- Detective sergeant;
- Support sergeant;
- Hospital officers (5);
- Receptions (2);
- Traffic safety analyst; and
- Data entry specialist.


To complicate the reporting relationships there is a wide range of functions and responsibilities performed by all the individuals directly supervised by the deputy chief. For example, functions and responsibilities of the patrol sergeants are vastly different from those performed by the support sergeant (corrections and dispatch), receptionists, and data entry specialist.

RECOMMENDATION 3-1:

Reorganize the department to reduce the number of direct reports to the deputy chief and to clearly delineate the primary functions of the department.

The department should be reorganized as shown in **Exhibit 3-3**. The proposed organizational structure would reduce the supervisory span of control of the deputy chief, more clearly delineate the key functional areas of the department, evenly distribute staff across the organization, and require the addition of three new positions (two commanders and one community support sergeant) and the elimination of two positions (deputy chief and SRO sergeant), for a net total of one new position.

EXHIBIT 3-3
City of Sunnyside Police Department
Proposed Organizational Structure



The proposed organizational structure reduces the number of direct reports to the deputy chief by splitting the position's supervisory responsibilities between two newly created commander positions while eliminating the deputy chief position. Under the proposed organizational structure, the commander over patrol and investigations would have seven direct reports and the commander over operations would have five direct reports. The proposed organizational structure would require the creation of three new positions (two commanders and a community support sergeant) and the elimination of two positions (deputy chief and SRO Sergeant). In addition, the proposed structure would divide the department's employees evenly between the two commands, with the Patrol and Investigations Command having 26 total staff and the Operations Command having 24 staff. Along with reducing the current number of reports to the deputy chief, a dedicated community support sergeant could engage in direct communication with the reserves to ensure they are receiving a proper level of attention to help guarantee the successful rebuild of the dwindling program. This proposed organizational structure and staffing level is presented in this chapter irrespective of suggested changes made in subsequent chapters of this report.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the city manager, should reorganize the police department along the lines outlined above, including the elimination of one position and the creation of three new positions. March 2012
2. The chief of police should seek formal approval of the new organizational structure and staff positions. April 2012
3. The chief of police should implement the new organizational structure. May 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

The implementation of the new organizational structure would require the elimination of the deputy chief position, the creation of two commander positions. Since there would not be a reduction in pay by changing the deputy chief position to a commander position, the fiscal impact would be from creating one commander position (\$89,000/year), plus benefits (30%).

The total fiscal impact from this recommendation would be approximately \$116,000 per year.

FINDING

During the course of the consulting team's interviews, it was mentioned by city management, police department staff, and some elected city leaders that there were concerns regarding the responsibilities of the police chief's administrative assistant. The concerns stemmed from confusion about whether the administrative assistant was responsible for supervising uniformed officers as well as acting as the police department's public information officer. It was their belief that the position was not intended to have those specific responsibilities.

A review of the administrative assistant's job classification description did not indicate any specific responsibility for supervising staff, and certainly not uniformed officers, nor any expressed responsibility to function as the department's public information officer. However, there is language in the job description that could be broadly interpreted to imply that the administrative assistant could function in some supervisory capacity and as a public information officer. For instance, the job classification description states the position "[S]erves as the primary contact and liaison between the Chief, Deputy Chief, staff, community and other agencies", which could lead some people to assume the position has explicit supervisory and public relations responsibilities.

During the course of the consulting team's interviews with city management and elected city leaders, it was mentioned several times that the person representing the police department with the media and similar outside organizations should be a high-ranking uniformed officer (e.g., chief, deputy chief, sergeant). That is, it should be a uniformed officer serving as a public information officer for the department.

RECOMMENDATION 3-2:

Rewrite the job classification description for the chief's administrative assistant to eliminate any confusion about the position's responsibilities, particularly those related to supervisory and public relations responsibilities.

In order to clear up any confusion about the administrative assistant's essential job functions, it is recommended that the duties and responsibilities of the position include the following:

- Analyze and interpret data and prepare reports, publications, and other documents, as directed.

3 Organization and Management

- Verify the accuracy and completeness of reports, as assigned.
- Respond to questions regarding administrative procedures and processes.
- Develop office forms, procedures, filing systems, and perform administrative tasks.
- Review, evaluate, and analyze administrative issues and recommend appropriate courses of action that may include changes to procedures and processes.
- May determine methods, operations, sequences, and procedures for assigned work.
- Initiate routine correspondence, as required.
- Prepare documents and letters that may include proprietary and confidential information.
- Create electronic files and documents including entering data into computer databases using a variety of office equipment and software applications.
- Handle mail and answer incoming calls, as needed.
- Schedule and coordinate meetings, as directed.

Additional job responsibilities may need to be included to address any specific duties not covered above.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the city's human resources staff, should rewrite the essential job functions for the administrative assistant position. March 2012
2. The chief of police should seek approval of the new job description. April 2012
3. Upon approval of the new job description, the chief of police should inform the administrative assistant of the changes to the position's job responsibilities. May 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be implemented with existing resources.

FINDING

The public has a persistent need to know and it is important that citizens receive information about law enforcement developments directly from the police department. Officers routinely confront issues of public concern. While some issues are routine, others are considerably more important. The public and media should know about these important issues. Therefore, the department must be prepared to deal with such issues and interact with citizens and the media.

A public information officer can be of great help in disseminating information and facilitating better interaction between the department, the media, and the public. In addition, the public information officer must be able to promote the value and mission of the department.

RECOMMENDATION 3-3:

The police chief should designate two sworn staff to serve as public information officers.

A solid background in police operations is a good foundation for a public information officer (PIO). A PIO must be seen as trustworthy, be a competent public speaker, and a skillful writer. The law enforcement background and good writing and speaking skills will help the PIO during demanding times.

Many PIOs come to the position without formal training but there are numerous organizations that offer training courses. For example, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) offers several opportunities throughout the year to participate in training programs. Some training could be offered free of charge from area PIO organizations or law enforcement training consortiums.

Training prepares the PIO to handle both extraordinary as well as day-to-day activities. Dealing with the public and the media should not be a haphazard attempt to pacify some inquiring person or news outlet. Instead, the interactions should be seen as opportunities to disseminate important information in a methodical way, as well as opportunities to reassure the public that the police department is prepared and handling situations in the best interest of the community.

RECOMMENDATION 3-4:

Provide training to staff selected to serve as public information officers.

Public information officer training courses typically cover the following topics:

- Communicate more effectively with the news media and public.
- Write news releases that have impact and get noticed.
- Understanding the real world of aggressive reporting and media ethics.
- Use the media to help solve your toughest cases.
- Build solid relationships with local reporters.

Training would help ensure the PIOs have the skills to properly represent the department and effectively carry out their responsibilities, particularly during times when the community needs to be reassured that the department is working in the best interest of the city.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

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| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with the city manager, should select two uniformed officers to serve as public information officers for the department. | March 2012 |
| 2. The chief of police, in consultation with the city manager, should determine the responsibilities of the department's public information officers. | March 2012 |
| 3. The chief of police should schedule training for the new public information officers to help ensure they have the skills needed to successfully assume their additional responsibilities. | April – May
2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

PIO training costs can range from \$295 to \$595 per person depending on the provider, course content and length of the course. Again, it is possible to get PIO training free of charge through some professional organizations and law enforcement consortiums but it is unclear at this time whether any regional training opportunities are available. If the PIOs must travel to receive training, there will be travel related expenses.

FINDING

The costs of crime are huge. When any crime is committed just about everyone in the community is impacted. There is certainly a direct impact on the victims of crime. But there is also an impact on everyone in the community in ways like higher insurance costs, lost and damaged property, diminished quality of life, loss of peace of mind, and the “overhead” costs to maintain a police department and judicial system.

Police departments exist to protect and serve the community and this means reducing the risks and damages of crime while at the same time seeking to improve the quality of life for everyone in the community. To achieve these goals, the police department implements strategies. In their efforts to better serve their communities, many departments articulate their strategies in long-term plans. The long-term plans typically present departments' strategies for addressing crime, the resources needed to realize the benefits of the strategies, and set priorities.

During interviews with the city's elected leaders, top city managers, and police department staff, it was mentioned several times that their law enforcement goal was "to make Sunnyside the safest city in the country." This is certainly an admirable and perhaps attainable goal. However, the Sunnyside Police Department does not have a long-term plan in support of that goal.

Additionally, some city leaders interviewed noted that the city has shown strong support for the police department by maintaining or increasing the department's budget during very lean financial times. As can be seen in the exhibit on page 2, the city's general fund budget *decreased* by an average of 5.53 percent between 2007 and 2011 while the police department's general fund budget *increased* by an average of 4.98 percent during the same period. Those same leaders wanted to know what the city is getting for its money.

The Sunnyside Police Department needs a long-term plan that sets priorities, articulates strategies, and provides a clear indication of how success at achieving its goals will be measured. The long-term plan also will help demonstrate what the city is getting for its financial investment in the department.

For example, one of the top priorities of the department could be to "enhance the quality of life for all citizens by reducing criminal activity and the conditions that foster crime and the fear of crime." The long-term plan could then list the strategies that would be employed by the department in support of this priority. For instance, the department could specify it would target certain types of crimes (e.g., certain crimes like robberies and assaults) and success would be measured by reductions in crime levels (i.e., crime rates and actual numbers of crimes). The department also could measure success by citizen perceptions that they feel safer and their quality of life has improved.

Another priority that most certainly should be included in the plan is the department's current initiative to disrupt and reduce gang activities. While the department has gone to great lengths in terms of defining its strategy on combating increased gang activity within the community, it has not provided measures by which the success of the strategy can be measured nor has it provided a timeline for the gang elimination strategy. In addition to increasing the collaborative process between the department and the community and allowing for more transparent operations, performance measures, and timelines for the

gang elimination strategy would allow city officials and citizens to understand when the suppression leg of the strategy has come to pass and the prevention and intervention operations will begin.

RECOMMENDATION 3-5:

The chief of police should prepare a long-term plan for the department.

The long-term plan should cover five years and be updated every year. Development of the plan should involve key department staff to help ensure their input is taken into consideration, to show their input is valued, and to gain their buy-in in the process.

It is important to measure success and measuring success typically involves numeric metrics. However, the goal should be to have a positive impact on the community. Therefore, the city and the department should focus on outcomes instead of outputs, on results instead of efforts.

There are many examples of police departments' long-term plans (strategic plans) that the Sunnyside Police Department could consider as models for its plan.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

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| 1. The chief of police should research other departments' long-term plans and select a plan to use as a model for the Sunnyside Police Department plan. | March 2012 |
| 2. The city manager and the chief of police should work together to set the goals and priorities of the police department that would be addressed in the department's long-term plan. | March 2012 |
| 3. The chief of police, working with the department's management team, should develop strategies and success measures in support of the department's goals and priorities. | April –
May 2012 |
| 4. The chief of police should present a draft long-term plan to the city manager for consideration. | June 2012 |
| 5. The city manger should provide feedback to the chief of police on the draft plan. | June 2012 |
| 6. The chief of police should incorporate the city manager's suggested changes and modifications into the plan. | June 2012 |
| 7. The plan should be presented to the city council for consideration. | July 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

The implementation of this recommendation could be accomplished within existing resources.

RECOMMENDATION 3-6:

The chief of police should insert performance measures and anticipated timelines for the newly introduced gang elimination strategy.

The gang elimination strategy as introduced by the SSPD and approved by the city council provides no way by which the effects of the strategy can be measured. Moreover, the deputy chief suggested in multiple conversations that the strategy relies heavily on suppression. However, the intensity at which the department is operating to achieve suppression cannot be sustained long-term. Instead, it is well accepted that intervention and prevention must also occur. By providing express measures, the department, as well as the city and its citizens, can understand where in the process the department is and how the approach to gang elimination may or may not change depending upon the results of the performance measures.

Moreover, as noted previously, the current level of suppression is not sustainable in perpetuity. All widely accepted gang strategies suggest that prevention and intervention must also occur. In providing a timeline for suppression, prevention, and intervention, the department will better involve the community. One of the basic tenants of the strategy is community involvement; therefore, timelines and performance measures can only help the department achieve this goal.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

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| 1. The chief of police should review the gang elimination strategy as distributed by the Sunnyside Police Department. | March 2012 |
| 2. The chief of police should caucus internally with his staff to determine appropriate, but realistic performance measures and timetables for the plan. | March 2012 |
| 3. The chief of police should present a revised gang elimination strategy to the city manager for consideration. | April 2012 |
| 4. The city manager should provide feedback to the chief of police on the revised strategy. | April 2012 |
| 5. The chief of police should incorporate the city manager's suggested changes and modifications into the plan. | April 2012 |
| 6. The plan should be presented to the city council for consideration. | May 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

The implementation of this recommendation could be accomplished within existing resources.

RECOMMENDATION 3-7:

The chief of police should diligently work toward improved communication and partnerships with community organizations to maximize community participation in gang elimination strategy.

The gang elimination strategy, as introduced by the SSPD and approved by the city council, identifies one of the four critical factors for success as “community support.” Moreover, the strategy emphasizes the need to “identify and nurture individuals within our community who are connected and willing to assist.” There are numerous other places within the department’s defined strategy in which the need for community partnership is stressed.

Sunnyside Promises is a local not-for-profit group that publishes the following as its mission:

“To ensure that all of our children receive the ‘5 Promises’

- *Caring Adults*
- *Safe Places*
- *Healthy Start*
- *Marketable Skills*
- *Opportunity to Serve*

When interviewed, the chief of police spoke of his work with this group. However, despite the chief’s involvement and a mission that seems critical to the success of a gang elimination strategy, when the consultants spoke with the group, its executive director reported a chilled relationship with the police department. While it may be that Sunnyside’s Promise can only add marginal value to the effort, the department and the city should work toward 100 percent inclusion regarding community participation of the gang elimination strategy. Discounting community groups that are in a position to directly impact the community’s anti-gang efforts is counter-productive to ensuring ultimate success of the strategy. Moreover, complete inclusion also includes frequent communication regarding strategy with the school district, as discussed in Chapter 5 of this report.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police should review the gang elimination strategy as distributed by the Sunnyside Police Department. March 2012
2. The chief of police should caucus internally with his staff to determine appropriate, but realistic opportunities to partner with community groups. March 2012

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| 3. The chief of police should reach out to those identified community groups through a series of meetings. | April 2012 |
| 4. In collaboration with previously identified community groups, the chief should identify expected contributions by those community groups. | April 2012 |
| 5. The expectations should be distilled down to an informal, written contract by and between the department and the community group. | May 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

The implementation of this recommendation could be accomplished within existing resources.

FINDING

Initial and on-going training of its law enforcement personnel is imperative to ensuring that a police department performs its duties and functions at an optimal level. Because this is important to ensuring the continued safety of both law enforcement officers and community members, the state of Washington has set minimum annual in-service training requirements for its law enforcement personnel of 24 hours annually.¹ Moreover, it is stated that training may be developed and/or provided by a department or sought through an approved list of available courses via the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission. Lastly, to ensure the training is adequately tracked, the commission will, upon request, provide a recordkeeping template for use by state agencies.

Exhibit 3-4 provides an account of the funds allocated for training, by account, for fiscal year 2011 and the year to date expenditures.

¹ See R.C.W. 139.05.300 (2011)

**EXHIBIT 3-4
Funds Allocated for Training vs. Training Expenditures, 2011
By Fund/Account**

Fund	Account	Account	Appropriated	Expenditures
General	Law Enforcement	Administration	\$2,000	\$467
		Investigations	\$200	\$184
		Patrol	\$300	\$36
		Training (General)	\$39,500	\$18,761
		SRO	\$100	\$97
Jail	Detention/Correction	Care & Custody	\$300	\$0
Investigative	Law Enforcement	Law Enforcement	\$0	\$3,093
PD Crime Prevention	Crime Prevention	Crime Prevention	\$500	\$442
		Explorers	\$800	\$0
Total			\$43,700	\$23,080

Source: City of Sunnyside, Department of Finance, September 29, 2011.

Despite the allocation of funds and an account of approximately half of those funds being spent on training, SSPD was unable to provide an accurate account of current training hours for its officers. Moreover, several officers reported a deficiency in their training, especially investigations. When asked for reasons in the reported deficiency, several reasons were given including lack of resources, failure for administration to schedule, and/or preference given to some officers for provision of adequate training.

RECOMMENDATION 3-8:

The chief of police should ensure the department is adequately trained to at least abide by those training requirements set forth by Washington state law.

While the cost of proper training may not be insignificant as indicated in the preceding exhibit, the cost of failing to train your law enforcement officers can be significant when accounting for the potential for increased exposure to liability for the city, and the potential for harm on behalf of both the officer and the citizens served by the officer.

As indicated, the Washington State Criminal Justice Commission will provide a template to track and monitor an officers annual training activities. The chief of police should obtain this template and designate a commanding officer to track each officer’s annual requirements, in terms of their ability to meet said requirements. **Exhibit 3-4** suggests that as of the end of September 2011, nearly half of the

annual budget for training has gone unspent despite repeated statements from numerous officers regarding their inability to obtain needed training. This was especially true for the newly created gang unit and the detectives, who despite dealing with six homicides last year, had never received anything more than on-the-job training for a homicide investigation. By failing to ensure adequate training, the department is risking the lives of its officers, Sunnyside citizens, and the financial well-being of the city.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

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| 1. The chief of police should review the current training policies and procedures. | March 2012 |
| 2. The chief of police should meet with the individual currently charged with tracking annual training for each officer to discuss options. | March 2012 |
| 3. The chief of police should caucus with sergeants to discuss options and the needs of the officers. | April 2012 |
| 4. The chief should revise procedures and policies regarding training to ensure adequate training is both received by all and tracked for all. | April 2012 |
| 5. If additional funds are necessary, the chief should review information obtained through previous steps with city manager. | May 2012 |
| 6. Chief should implement changed policies and procedures regarding training. | June 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

The implementation of this recommendation could be accomplished within existing resources, per **Exhibit 3-4**.

4 PATROL OPERATIONS

Background

The Sunnyside Police Department provides law enforcement services for the city. Patrol officers typically drive their patrol vehicles within the city limit responding to “calls for service” from the police dispatcher, backing up other officers who respond to calls for service, or patrolling the streets looking for criminal or other activity that warrants their attention. When the patrolling activity leads to a traffic stop, walking around the premises of a business, assisting citizens in need of help, or questioning a group of citizens, or other activity that occupies an officer’s time, it is similar to a response to a call for service and is referred to as a self-initiated call.

The patrol function is often augmented by the use of reserve officers. Reserve officers patrol streets, driving city patrol vehicles, either by themselves or with another reserve officer, and for all intents and purposes have much of the responsibilities and duties of patrol officers, including arrest powers; they just don’t get paid. Reserves are covered in more detail another chapter of this report.

Organization and Management


Organizationally, patrol officers report to a sergeant on each shift. The patrol sergeants report to the deputy chief of police. (Organizational structure is covered in chapter 3 of this report; and therefore, is only briefly discussed in this chapter for purposes of context for the reader.) Currently, each patrol shift consists of two to five officers and a sergeant on duty. Ideally once all newly hired officers have completed their training, each shift will have three officers and a sergeant. As is typical with small jurisdictions, patrol functions are not organized around geographic regions or sections of the city. Rather, each officer may patrol any area and can be dispatched to any area of the city in response to a citizen call for service or to respond to an alarm.

Four sergeants assigned to the patrol unit serve as shift supervisors. Sergeants and patrol officers work 12-hour shifts, 6:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. or 6:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M. with four consecutive days on followed by four consecutive days off. One sergeant is on duty for each shift. In addition to supervising

officers and minding administrative duties, sergeants are often performing patrol activities as well. Each group of officers and the shift sergeant work the same shift with the same days off. The group is referred to as Patrol A, B, C, or D. Patrol staff rotate between day and nights shifts every six work cycles (a work cycle is eight days).

In addition to the standard patrol officers, a K-9 unit is attached to a patrol unit and works a 12-hour schedule; however, the officer/canine team is scheduled for a 3:00 P.M. to 3:00 A.M. shift.

The Sunnyside police department patrol function organization chart is provided in **Exhibit 4-1**.



At the time this study was initiated, patrol shifts were not staffed as intended due to a high number of newly hired officers. The newly hired officers were still in the field training phase of their employment status, and as such, were working side by side with another officer (FTO). Once that component of training is completed each and every shift will have one sergeant and three officers. Moreover, an additional patrol officer position is being added. This position, referred to by the department as officer number “31”, will give the patrol units of the department an additional officer which should

provide the department with the ability to cover absences for vacation and other leave days off without relying exclusively on overtime to provide coverage.

FINDING

There are no documented criteria for staffing a shift when a team member is not working their shift because he or she is on vacation, sick leave, or compensatory time off. The decision to back-fill or hold an officer over for a few hours on overtime is made on a case by case basis. There is no mandatory minimum staffing requirements in the collective bargaining agreement between the city and the police officer guild. The department's approved staffing levels are referred to in its standard operating procedures (SOP) or rules and regulation manual. The deputy chief of police indicated the approved staffing level would be considered the minimum staffing for patrol and the policy calls for an approved staffing level of two officers scheduled for day shifts and three officers scheduled for night shifts. Although this policy is not written, according to the deputy chief, it was covered with sergeants at a staff meeting and in an email. No documentation was provided to substantiate the effective date of this policy. Other than this, the consultant team was not provided a standard criteria upon which the sergeant decides to use overtime for coverage. Nevertheless, overtime is used extensively to cover shifts. This topic is covered more extensively elsewhere in this report.

RECOMMENDATION 4-1:

The Chief and the Deputy Chief of police should establish a formal mandatory minimum staffing standard in the department's SOP.

This would guide supervisors as they have to make decisions on using overtime to fill shifts that are not at full-staffing due to officers off on vacation, sick, or other benefit time. Standards also should provide guidance for when overtime is necessary for an entire shift or only for certain hours depending on which shift and day of the week. Because demand for service during early morning hours on most, if not all, days of the week is very low and there is little if any activity, a level of flexibility should be provided for in any mandatory staffing standard. For example, there is little justification for, and the department does not necessarily need, three patrol officers and a sergeant on duty at 3:00 A.M. or 4:00 A.M. Rather

than a generic use of a term such “three at night” for a standard, consideration should be given to standards for certain hours and days of the week and others should be at management’s discretion.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the deputy chief and patrol sergeants, should review current policy, along with current demand as driven by calls for service. March/April
2012
2. A formal minimum staffing standard should be written into the SOP and implemented. May 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

The fiscal impact of implementing this recommendation will depend upon the subsequent minimum staffing standard developed, any adjustments made to current deployment practices as a result of the CAD data analysis provided in this report, and what, if any, recommendations provided in this report that will be implemented.

FINDING

A modern law enforcement agency deploys an enormous amount of technology to ensure that it stays one step ahead of the criminals while ensuring the safety of both the citizens to which it serves and the officers it employs. Sunnyside is no different. The department, similar to most modern departments, employs mobile data units (MDUs) in its automobiles. These devices are essentially networked computers located in an officer’s automobile that allow the automobile to quickly access relevant information and remain in constant communication with dispatch, his/her fellow officers, and supervisors.

An officer in the field depends heavily on this unit for all of the above reasons. An officer’s safety, along with the safety of citizens, depends on the officer’s ability to quickly access information and communicate with his/her colleagues, supervisors, and communications officers in real time. The SSPD recently purchased new patrol cars, which required the installation of these MDUs.

Sunnyside currently employs one full-time IT personnel to attend to all of Sunnyside’s IT needs. In addition to the time scarcity resulting on these demands, the IT individual who is required to serve several entities and each of their specific need has little time to focus on the particular needs of a particular department. This means he is unable to undergo the training necessary to obtain the requisite level of expertise to attend to SSPD’s IT needs in an efficient manner. As a result, many of the MDUs have failed

in recent months, rendering an officer incapable of communicating properly or quickly accessing relevant data while answering a call or responding to an incident. Not only does this expose an officer to needless risk, it can impede the department from exercising its law enforcement duties in the most efficient manner possible.

RECOMMENDATION 4-2:

The chief should work with the city manager to identify ways in which the department could improve the level of IT support currently available.

By doing such, the critical IT needs of the department would be met without overburdening the resources of the city, including the sole individual currently tasked with the entirety of the city's IT needs. Several individuals indicated discussions had been had that suggested that Sunnyside would outsource its needs to Yakima County. By doing so, the city would expand the level of expertise and personnel currently available to it. Moreover, it would ensure the timely response to critical IT needs and ensure that future occasions by which an officers equipment fails him/her while in the field responding to calls and other critical incidents in the community.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

- | | |
|---|---------------------|
| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with the city manager should discuss the needs of the department in terms of IT. | March/April
2012 |
| 2. The city manager should negotiate a contract with Yakima County, by which its experts and resources are available to the city and the SSPD on a regular, consistent, reliable basis. | May 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

The fiscal impact of implementing this recommendation will depend upon the cost of contracting these services with the county. However, it has been suggested that the current IT professional would no longer be employed by the city, but rather become an employee of the county; therefore, any cost associated with such an agreement would likely be offset by a reduction of one full-time employee.

Span of Control

Recent hires by the department has the department with a chief, a deputy chief, four sergeants in patrol, and one sergeant each for detectives, SROs, and corrections. "Span of control" is defined as the number of subordinates who report to one supervisory employee. The average span of control for an organization is the ratio of all employees (including supervisors, managers, and directors) to supervisory

staff. “Layers of management,” another useful concept, means the number of steps (supervisors) between a frontline employee and the chief executive.

In the early 1990s, cities such as Portland and Seattle began to examine spans of control and management layers in an effort to improve organizational efficiency and effectiveness. These factors determine the way an organization communicates with and delegates duties to its units and individual employees. As the Seattle city auditor has stated:

Too few staff per manager diminishes an organization’s effectiveness because it does not fully utilize the talents of its higher paid managers, who could manage more staff. It also does not fully utilize the service-level staff member who could assume more responsibility. However, too many staff per manager also diminishes an organization’s effectiveness because managers are overburdened and subordinates are left without sufficient coaching, training or direction.¹

FINDING

SSPD’s overall span of control is 1:6 (based on 54 employees). The department has 45 authorized staff-level positions including police officers, dispatchers, correctional officers, SROs, hospital officers, and administrative staff, with 14 in patrol units. Including the chief, deputy chief and seven sergeants, SSPD has nine managerial/supervisory positions. The patrol unit has four sergeants and 14 officers for a span of control ratio of 1:3.5.

Spans of control in law enforcement have important implications. “Flat” organizations—those with relatively few management layers and low spans of control—focus decision-making authority close to the units that provide direct services. In particular, agencies with a strong focus on community/problem solving policing want frontline staff to be as autonomous as possible in dealing with community issues. General standards for patrol officers per sergeant range from 1:7 to as high as 1:15.² SSPD’s current ratio of patrol sergeants to officers (1:3.5) is far below industry standards, which is typical of small departments, where although shift strength is rather small, supervisors need to be on duty at all times. It is not necessarily an indicator of an inefficiency other than a normal one found in small departments. This organization is appropriately flat with only three levels separating the chief from front line staff.

¹ City Auditor, City of Seattle, Audit Report, September 19, 2005, p. 16.

² Samuel Walker, *The New World of Police Accountability*, Omaha, Nebraska, 2005, p. 182 and Troy Lane, “Span of Control for Law Enforcement Agencies,” *The Police Chief Magazine*, October 2006, p. 1.

Based on its staff rank and organizational structures, we conclude that SSPD's spans of control are appropriate and that all functional areas are fairly flat. Three management levels between front-line officers and other staff and the chief are appropriate. Too often, law enforcement organizations impose multiple management ranks, such as corporals, captains, and majors, which serve only to provide opportunities for promotions and have little or no functional or organizational purpose.

COMMENDATION 4-1:

SSPD is commended for developing an efficient and effective organizational structure that is appropriately flat for an organization of its size and mission.

It has a very low ratio, which typically indicates an inefficient and top heavy organization, but in this case is an appropriate ratio of supervisors to staff given the size of the department and its numerous and diverse functions.

Shifts and Schedules

Because of the 24-hour/seven-day per week nature of law enforcement work, police officers, dispatchers, and corrections officers must work in shifts. SSPD police officers work 12-hour shifts, changing at 6:00 A.M. and 6:00 P.M. They work four consecutive days followed by four consecutive days off. This compressed and unusual work week is not used in many jurisdictions around the country, but seems to be favorable throughout the state of Washington. Typically, 12-hour shifts are worked in a 14-day period that includes seven days on and seven off with mixture of two, three, or four consecutive days on or off. The use of an 8-day period with four consecutive days on and four consecutive days off is less common.

A 2002 study appearing in the *National Institute of Justice Journal* examined the issue of police fatigue, noting that longer shift lengths had little negative impact concerning fatigue because the officers worked fewer days per month. However, when accounting for considerable overtime, fatigue may become an issue.

Generally, FLSA requires employers to compensate employees (at one and one-half times the regular rate) for working more than 40-hour workweeks. However, federal exemptions to the 40-hour work week requirement were established for employees engaged in law enforcement activities. For this

group of employees overtime is due if they work more than 171 hours during a 28-day work period or this same ratio for a work period of at least seven but less than 28 days.³ For employees engaged in law enforcement, the ratio of 171 hours to 28 days is 6.11 (rounded) hours per day.

Exhibit 4-2 shows the FLSA schedule of maximum number of hours that can be worked in any adopted work period for law enforcement (and detention staff) in a work period between seven and 28 days.

EXHIBIT 4-2
FLSA Maximum Hours Standard

Work Period (days)	Fire Protection	Law Enforcement
28	212	171
27	204	165
26	197	159
25	189	153
24	182	147
23	174	141
22	167	134
21	159	128
20	151	122
19	144	116
18	136	110
17	129	104
16	121	98
15	114	92
14	106	86
13	98	79
12	91	73
11	83	67
10	76	61
9	68	55
8	61	49
7	53	43

Source: 29 Title 29, part 553 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 553.230.

SSPD law enforcement and detention personnel work essentially an 8-day workweek. They work 12-hour shifts for four consecutive days on-duty followed by four consecutive days off-duty. Within that 8-day period they could work as many as 49 hours without having to be paid an overtime premium. SSPD officers are assigned to work 48 hours.

³ 29 C.F.R. § 553.230 (2011).

FINDING

The 12-hour shifts worked by SSPD officers in the patrol and other units are popular and meet departmental needs by fully covering the 24-hour day with only two shifts per day. The use of 12-hour shifts means that officers work four days (48 hours) in an 8-day work period, which can be accomplished without incurring overtime because of a federal wage-law exemption. The 8-day work schedule, however, which alternates between four days on/four days off, is physically demanding on police and corrections officers because it requires them to work a compressed workweek of 48 hours in four days, every eight days. Where this can become troublesome for both officers and departments alike is when overtime is worked at a rate other than just occasionally.

RECOMMENDATION 4-3:

Assess the level of fatigue experienced by the current shift schedule, including the quality of their sleep and fatigue experienced while on duty.

Department supervisors should assess these factors by observation and interviews or through an anonymous survey. In addition, supervisors should assess officers' attitudes toward fatigue, overtime, and other work-hour issues. The assignment of overtime should be minimized for those officers who have just completed working 48 hours in four consecutive days or have already worked 12 hours and additional coverage of more than couple of hours is needed.

Some departments that use 12-hour shifts use a schedule that involves officers working a series of two or three consecutive days followed by two or three consecutive days off in a 14-day work period. This means officers are not scheduled for more than three consecutive days (unlike the four in Sunnyside) and actually get every other weekend off.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police should work with his patrol sergeants to develop and deploy a survey regarding fatigue. March/April
2012
2. Patrol sergeants should conduct targeted ride-alongs. May – June 2012
3. A complete analyses of the results of observations and surveys should be conducted to identify potential issues born of existing fatigue among the officers. July 2012
4. Where appropriate, shifts/schedules should be adjusted to account for fatigue. July – August 2012

5. Supervisors should be fully aware of how many hours an officer has already worked in their compressed work period and in each day and considered possible fatigue issues before assigning overtime. On-going

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be implemented with existing resources.

FINDING

The recent hiring of “officer 31” should reduce reliance on overtime if it is used extensively as a relief position for patrol positions that require a staff person be on duty at all. This officer should be able to cover at least 43 weeks of vacation for the patrol units. It does not appear that a flexible / vacation relief position is provided for in the agreement with the guild; if not, it should be considered.

RECOMMENDATION 4-4:

When possible, the current labor agreement should be amended to include a vacation relief position.

The vacation relief position may be a bided shift but may have to rotate shifts and days off on a routine basis. And while this could prove to be a challenge with the four days on and four off work schedule, the allowance for one would reduce the amount of overtime paid to back-fill for paid time off.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with command staff, should review current staffing practices to ascertain the viability of creating a vacation relief position. | March/April
2012 |
| 2. If it is determined that such a position would net a cost savings, the chief of police should work with the city’s current legal representation in preparation for the next labor agreement negotiation. | On-going |
| 3. At such time the labor agreement for the police department is renegotiated, an allowance for a vacation relief position should be allowed. | Next labor agreement
negotiation |

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation could be implemented with existing city resources and should result in a reduced reliance on overtime. This is not a recommendation to create a new position, but rather a suggestion for a cost-efficient way to use the recently filled position (officer #31) to reduce the over-reliance on overtime. This position should provide more than 1,500 hours of patrol coverage, most of which, overtime is currently being used to cover. The savings could be as much as \$50,000 annually.

Calls for Service

Call Priority

In addition to routine patrols, police patrol officers must respond to calls for service from citizens, visitors, and businesses in the city. They also initiate their own calls for service when they notice crimes or other activities that need attention while on patrol.

“911” and other emergency calls received by the Yakima County Sheriff Office are transferred to the Sunnyside Police Department dispatch office and are prioritized by dispatchers, unless the dispatch system assigns a priority based on the nature of the call, into one of three priorities. However, in reality calls are classified in the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system into one of five priority categories: 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 (although data show a handful of other categories used, these are disregarded by consultant). According to the department’s SOP (Regulations), the criteria used to assign a priority code depends on when the event occurred and whether it is a crime against a person or a property crime. The codes in the SOP are as follows:

- First Priority (priority 1)—calls for events currently in progress involving imminent threat to life or the possibility of bodily injury;
- Second Priority (priority 2) —calls for events in progress involving criminal activity regarding property rather than persons; and
- Third Priority (priority 3)—calls for “crimes with no suspects present.”

There were no definitions for the other codes noted in the SOP.

FINDING

The practices and the system SSPD uses to establish call priorities may result in delays and inefficiencies because practices don’t appear to align with SOPs or CAD’s system coding of priorities and because the SOPs have a very limited number of codes that don’t reflect the universe of codes in the CAD system, and the descriptors are not written very clearly. The system was recently changed and priority numbers were modified. The change may have led to inconsistent application of the codes by call takers/dispatchers and officers.

RECOMMENDATION 4-5:

The department should adjust the priority system so it considers both the time of the offense *and* its seriousness, particularly in the case of violent offenses (such as those in the Uniform Crime Report).

The policy and procedures used for assigning priority should be established in writing and be applied consistently. The SOPs should reflect they CAD system’s priority coding options. There should be little, if any, inconsistency and concern that dispatches are using codes from an old system. Also we don’t believe the presence or lack of presence of a suspect should be the sole criteria for priority 3 calls.

SSPD may wish to consider using a matrix such as the following for assigning codes:

When event occur	Violent	Nonviolent Serious	Not Serious
Current	1	2	3
Just Happened	1	3	4
Within Day	2	3	4
Over A Day	2	3	4

Otherwise, SSPD priority code should be clarified and formalized in the SOP so that dispatchers and officers are operating in concert. Moreover, priority codes with the CAD system should be reviewed to ensure only those codes that are formally established can be entered into the system.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the command staff, should review current call priority ratings. March/April 2012
2. If deemed appropriate, the chief of police should re-align call priority to achieve a more efficient dispatch. May – August 2012
3. Once re-aligned, the priority codes should be formalized in the departments SOP and all officers trained on newly revised priority codes. September 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be achieved with existing departmental resources.

Response Time

Response time—the time needed for a patrol officer to respond to a call for service—is typically a matter of intense interest to community and department leaders and citizens alike. The performance measure typically cited in law enforcement is the response time for priority 1 calls, however defined. The

time period measured begins when the call is picked up at the emergency communications center and ends when an officer first arrives on the scene.

Response time can be considered in two segments:

- the period of time running from when a dispatcher receives a call to when the dispatcher sends an officer to the scene; and
- the period of time running from when a patrol officer receives the dispatch assignment to his or her arrival at the scene.


The city’s dispatch (CAD) system tracks and “time stamps” all calls and certain actions related to each. MGT’s review of October 1, 2010, through September 30, 2011, dispatch data found that dispatchers received, prioritized, and dispatched priority 1 calls in an average of 4.1 minutes. Patrol officers arrived on the scene after dispatch in an average of 4.4 minutes. Therefore, the combined response time for priority 1 calls from call pickup to an officer’s arrival on the scene was 8.5 minutes (**Exhibit 4-3**). It appears this same level of rapid response applies to priority 2 calls as well. This may be due to the vague descriptors in the SOP used to classify calls. These data are shown again in graph format in **Exhibit 4-4**.

EXHIBIT 4-3
City of Sunnyside Police Department
Duration of Time for First Responder

Call Priority	Number of Calls	Dispatch Time	1st Drive Time	Total 1st Responder Response Time
1	625	4.1	4.4	8.5
2	581	3.9	4.3	8.2
3	1,417	5.0	4.7	9.7
4	518	7.0	5.4	12.4
5	360	6.8	5.3	12.1
No Priority Listed	568	6.3	4.6	10.9
All other categories	5	2.9	6.2	9.1
Total	4,074	5.3	4.7	10.0

Source: City of Sunnyside Police Department, October 2011.

EXHIBIT 4-4
Sunnyside Police Department - Patrol Units
Response Time to Calls for Service, in Minutes
October 2010 – September 2011



Source: Sunnyside Police Department data from CAD system, October 2011.

FINDING

SSPD’s response to priority 1 calls, from call pickup to officer on scene, averaged about 8.5 minutes. The department has no targets or goals for response time. Such indicators of performance are often used by city and county law enforcement agencies. Priority 2 calls have even a slightly shorter response time, which indicates there is little difference in the response by officers to either of these two highest priority calls. This could be because the descriptors of the priority codes are vague so priority codes 1 and 2 are treated the same. Response time indicators can be helpful for setting budget priorities when resources are being requested, for informing citizens of department policies, procedures and goals, and to measure actual performance. The SOP makes no reference to codes other than 1, 2, and 3. The report of dispatch data indicated eight codes of numbers and even a symbol in the CAD system. Also, many events had no priority code associated.

RECOMMENDATION 4-6:

SSPD should establish response time goals to better inform and serve the community.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with patrol command staff, should review current response times to ascertain appropriate goals. | March – May
2012 |
| 2. After careful review, the chief of police should establish formal response time goals. | June 2012 |
| 3. Patrol response times should be periodically reviewed with both command staff and patrol officers to ensure established goal is achieved. | On-going |

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be achieved with existing departmental resources.

Call Volume

According to SSPD data, its officers responded to 12,166 calls for service from October 1, 2010, through September 30, 2011. Of the total number of calls, MGT’s analysis indicates 4,074 were initiated by citizen calls for which dispatchers sent at least one officer and 8,092 were officer initiated calls.

Exhibit 4-5 examines these calls by initial origin and priority.

**EXHIBIT 4-5
Sunnyside Police Department
Calls for Service
October 2010-September 2011**

Priority Level	Citizen-Initiated Calls for Service	Officer-Initiated Calls	Total Calls
No Priority Code	568	2,314	2,882
Priority 1	625	517	1,142
Priority 2	581	427	1,008
Priority 3	1,417	2,404	3,821
Priority 4	518	1,689	2,207
Priority 5	360	738	1,098
Other Priorities	5	3	8
Total	4,074	8,092	12,166

Source: SSPD CAD, October 2011 and MGT analysis of data for estimate of officer-initiated calls.

The following exhibit, **Exhibit 4-6**, shows the citywide average number of calls for service (CFS) by day of the week. On average, there are 11 dispatched calls (citizen-initiated) and 22 officer initiated calls for service per day. There is very little variation by day of the week in Sunnyside for citizen-initiated calls, while the officer initiated calls vary by about 50 percent from the lowest day (Sunday) to the highest day (Friday). On average, officers handle about five calls per 12-hour shift. This average is based on the

12,166 CFS divided by the number of patrol officers (12) and the number of days each officer works on average in a year, when overtime and leave time are considered.

EXHIBIT 4-6
Sunnyside Police Department
Average Daily Number of Calls for Service
October 2010-September 2011

Day	Citizen-Initiated Calls for Service	Officer-Initiated Calls for Service	Total Calls for Service
Sunday	11	19	30
Monday	11	22	33
Tuesday	12	21	32
Wednesday	12	21	33
Thursday	10	22	32
Friday	11	27	38
Saturday	12	23	35
Daily Average	11	22	33
Annual Total	4,074	8,092	12,166

Source: SSPD CAD, October 2011 and MGT analysis of data for estimate of officer-initiated.

NOTE: Daily averages reflect rounding of daily averages and are not the average of the figures in the column.

Exhibit 4-7 examines calls for service by time of day. It is apparent from this exhibit that officers are much less busy between the hours of midnight through 9:00 A.M. This calls in to question the policy of requiring three officers on duty for the 6:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M. shift.

EXHIBIT 4-7
Sunnyside Police Department
Monthly Average
All Calls for Service by Time of Day
October 2010-September 2011

Time	Calls for Service	Percent of Calls
Midnight to 3:00 A.M.	86	8.5%
3: 00 A.M.-6:00 A.M.	36	3.5%
6: 00 A.M.-9:00 A.M.	84	8.2%
9: 00 A.M.-Noon	136	13.4%
Noon-3:00 P.M.	145	14.3%
3:00 P.M.-6:00 P.M.	152	15.0%
6:00 P.M.-9:00 P.M.	201	19.8%
9:00 P.M.-Midnight	175	17.3%
Monthly Average	1,014	100.0%

Source: SSPD CAD data, October 2010—September 2011.

NOTE: Average number of events does not equal the total monthly number of events due to rounding.

Exhibit 4-8 shows the average length of time spent on each event (call or service) from the time of the call until completion. Based on the calculated average 30-minute length of time and an average of five calls per shift per officer, patrol officers spend 21 percent of their shift responding to calls that come from citizens or that are self-initiated. Thus, on average patrol officers have almost 80 percent (9.5 hours) of each shift free for proactive policing activities, administrative duties, and breaks. Historically, and due to the relatively small size and rural nature of police departments, they typically have many idiosyncrasies and staffing inefficiencies; however, MGT has never encountered a department that its officers had that much discretionary time.

In addition to responding to and initiating calls for service, patrol officers in Sunnyside investigate crimes. Officers may carry a caseload of several crimes that they need to “work” to help solve a case. This is covered more fully in another section of this report, but is noted here because it is another activity that requires officer time and is not reflected in the analysis of CAD data. As noted in the section on investigations and detectives no data are available to analyze how much time is spent on that activity and therefore, is not included in our analysis; however some portion of the uncommitted time may be used for this purpose.

EXHIBIT 4-8
Sunnyside Police Department
Average Daily Number of Call Responses by Deputies
October 2010-September 2011

Day	Average # of Calls	Difference between Average # of Calls by Day and the Daily Average	Average Duration Minutes from Dispatch to Clearance
Sunday	30.3	-9.0%	29
Monday	32.6	-2.0%	32
Tuesday	32.4	-2.6%	31
Wednesday	32.9	-1.4%	31
Thursday	32.2	-3.4%	32
Friday	38.2	14.5%	28
Saturday	34.7	4.1%	28
Daily Average	33.3		30
Annual Total	12,166		365,826

Source: SSPD CAD system, October 2011.

NOTE: These times are the total times for all patrol officers working on the event and include only calls that last more than one minute in duration as indicated in the CAD system.

Exhibit 4-9 illustrates the demand for patrol officer services and the duration of call events based on time of day.

EXHIBIT 4-9
Sunnyside Police Department
Average Number of Call Responses
And Duration of Calls by Time of Day
October 2010-September 2011

Time Period	Average # of Events	Average Duration in Minutes from Dispatch to Clearance (drive time +on scene time)
Midnight to 3 A.M.	86	38
3 A.M. to 6 A.M.	36	36
6 A.M. to 9 A.M.	84	28
9 A.M. to Noon	136	35
Noon to 3 P.M.	145	33
3 P.M. to 6 P.M.	152	30
6 P.M. to 9 P.M.	201	23
9 P.M. to Midnight	175	27
Monthly Average	1,014	30
Annual Total	12,166	365,826

Source: SSPD CAD system, October 2011.

NOTE: Number of events does not equal the monthly total due to rounding.

Based on the nature of the call, dispatchers will often send more than one officer to the scene of a crime. **Exhibit 4-10** shows that in Sunnyside about 20 percent of all calls have a backup officer dispatched. As expected, this ranges from a high of 26 percent for the highest priority calls to 15 percent to lowest priority calls. This analysis is based on what was recorded in the CAD system. So if other officers not assigned to respond to a particular call, went to the dispatched location and let the dispatcher know, it should have been recorded. Alternately, officers may just drive to the scene and not inform the dispatcher and the event would not be recorded in the system.

Officers, without other pressing issues, may want to go to a scene of a crime just to ensure their fellow officer does need any assistance or even provide some assistance without being requested or dispatched. This practice was observed by MGT consultants while conducting on-site visits. This is typical of police officers and can improve officer and citizen safety. When this occurs it is important that dispatchers be informed, and this action recorded in the CAD system.

EXHIBIT 4-10
Sunnyside Police Department
Percent of Calls for Service for which Backup Officers were on scene
October 2010 through September 2011

Priority	Percent of Calls with More than 1 Unit Recording Action
1	26.0%
2	22.5%
3	21.7%
4	21.0%
5	15.1%
No Priority Listed	12.6%
All other categories	33.3%
Total	19.8%

Source: SSPD CAD System, October 2011.

EXHIBIT 4-11
Sunnyside Police Department
Estimated Discretionary Time for Patrol Officers
Based on Calendar Year 2010

Number of Patrol Officers			12
Maximum Annual Number of Hours per Officer			2,190
	Hours Yearly	Percentage Available	Hours Remaining
BASE	26,280		26,280
Patrol Office Overtime	5,745	100.0%	32,025
Patrol Officer Leave	3,873	87.9%	28,152
Training Based on Standard	288	87.0%	27,864
Hours on Duty			27,864
Time by Activity		Hours	Percent of On-Duty Time
Normal Patrol Activity (365,826 minutes)		6,097	21.9%
Total Discretionary Time		21,766	78.1%
Administrative Time (est. 25%)		6,966	25.0%
Estimated Proactive Time		14,800	53.1%

Source: Sunnyside CAD and Overtime Data, October 2011.

NOTE: WAC 139-05-300 requirement for in-service training states that effective January 1, 2006, every peace officer certified under RCW 43.101.095 will complete a minimum of twenty-four hours of in-service training annually. (<http://apps.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=139-05-300>)

Exhibit 4-11 shows MGT's calculation of its estimate for the amount of discretionary (uncommitted) and proactive time available to SSPD patrol officers.

FINDING

SSPD patrol officers, on average, have a substantial amount of time (more than nine hours) on each shift that is uncommitted (not spent responding to calls for services). Some uncommitted time is needed for administrative duties, but even if 25 percent of this time is used for administrative activities that leaves about six and a half hours (53 percent of a 12 hour shift) of uncommitted time per day. This is an unusually large amount of time. Typically, this figure is closer to 15 to 35 percent. As noted earlier, some of this time may be spent investigating crimes, but how much time, is not captured in any system.

RECOMMENDATION 4-7:

The SSPD chief of police should review how uncommitted patrol officers' time is being spent to ensure that these hours are directed toward crime prevention and improving the quality of life for Sunnyside citizens, based on performance data (preferably developed through a COMPSTAT system, which is covered elsewhere in this report), an analysis of calls for service, and departmental goals and objectives.

As part of this review, the department should develop minimum staffing guidelines for patrol shifts, based on the data derived from this review and the community's expectations and community policing objectives, and not a blanket policy of two officers on days and three on nights. This should help establish criteria for determining whether overtime is needed when deputies are absent from duty, and where supervisors should direct their resources on a day-to-day basis.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation patrol command staff should review data and identify alternative activities for patrol during uncommitted time. March/April
2012
2. Once that time is identified and alternative activities are developed, command staff should instruct officers as to appropriate activities for those time periods, including the measures by which the officers time will be measured. May/June 2012
2. Periodic, regular evaluations should be achieved by command staff, in consultation with the chief, with patrol officers to ensure uncommitted time is maximized. On-going

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be implemented with existing department resources. A level approaching 80 percent uncommitted time without a formal strategy on how to spend that time is highly unusual. If no plan for tactical activities or other proactive policing can be developed, a reduction in patrol in patrol force may be necessary. A reduction in patrol force, although an exact amount cannot be calculated at this time, would obviously result in a financial gain for the city.

RECOMMENDATION 4-8:

A power shift of noon to midnight or even 2:00 P.M. to 2:00 A.M. should be considered to better fit demand for service.

The use of power shifts helps departments match their resources with the demand for services and helps minimize the short periods of idle time, which reflects overstaffing and is inefficient.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation patrol command staff, should review the current staffing and deployment models. March/April
2012
2. Once the possibility for such a power shift is identified, the patrol command staff should identify and deploy a new staffing model employing such a power shift. May 2012
3. A review of changes to the deployment models and its overall effect on both cost savings and crime reduction should be reviewed at some time in the future. August 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be implemented with existing department resources. This is not a recommendation for another position. It is only to consider a change in scheduling which could result in some level of savings per year in terms of saved man hours and reduced inefficiencies.

RECOMMENDATION 4-9:

Notwithstanding the previous recommendation, the department should consider stationing one patrol officer in the jail during the early morning, low peak, hours.

This would help ensure adequate security and safety in the city jail, which as motioned in another chapter is staffed rather thinly at certain times of the day.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation patrol command staff, should review the current staffing and deployment models. March/April
2012
2. Once the possibility for such a change in deployment is identified, the patrol command staff should identify and deploy a new staffing model based on this recommendation. May 2012

3. A review of changes to the deployment models and its overall effect on both cost savings and crime reduction should be reviewed at some time in the future.

August 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be implemented with existing department resources.

Overtime

According to the Sunnyside police department rules and regulations manual (SOPs), the policy of the city is to “avoid the need for overtime work” and “authorized overtime is to be kept to a minimum.” Based on a review of 2010 and year-to-date 2011 payroll data, patrol operations does not do a good job of avoiding or even minimizing overtime. When compared to police departments in other jurisdictions with which the consultant is familiar, with other divisions in SSPD, as well as with other departments in the city, the use of overtime is out of control.

Through July 31, 2011, the 27 staff (excluding the chief and deputy chief) in the police department (accounting department code 4.0), which includes patrol, detectives, gang officers, SROs, and the HUD officer had been paid \$231,874 in overtime, or about equal to 23.5 percent of their regular salary. This averages \$8,588 for the year-to-date or about \$1,226 per month. By comparison, staff in the jail had been paid overtime at a rate of 6.5 percent of their regular salary.

For 2010, this figure (overtime pay as a percent of salary) for corrections (jail staff) was 9.4 percent and for police officers and sergeants it was 26.8 percent. So on the surface overtime has improved when comparing 2011 to 2010, but it is only based on year-to-date for 2011 so it is difficult to draw major conclusions because there could be seasonal variations coming at the end of a calendar year. Nevertheless, overtime as a percent of regular salary for police officers appears to be going down, but when corrections is compared to the law enforcement side of the department, law enforcement (police officers) overtime has not improved as dramatically as the jail.

In 2010, on the average, police officers worked 302 hours of overtime (25 hours per month), while sergeants worked 469 hours (39 hours per month). On average, officers were paid \$11,743 in overtime and sergeants were paid twice as much, earning almost \$24,000 in overtime, with one sergeant getting

more than \$32,000 for the year. Again, not to belabor the point, but these are extraordinary figures. And clearly, little attention is paid to the policy that overtime is to be avoided. This is not only important for the city's financial health, but also for the employees. Excessive overtime can lead to fatigue, which as mentioned in another part of this report is an issue of concern for policing agencies.

One sergeant, a position of authority which should be focused on the aforementioned policy to minimize overtime, has actually received more overtime pay in the current year (through July 31, 2011) than any other department employee. It was reported that this sergeant spends many hours making trips to Seattle to deal with issues regarding the purchase of new police vehicles. This practice does not appear to be a wise use of time. If it is required that a member of the department go to the dealership, why not send an experienced officer from the day shift to avoid or at least minimize overtime usage? Spending an additional \$500 or more in overtime per day (plus fuel and other vehicle costs) while going to Seattle will certainly drive up the cost of a police vehicle especially if there are multiple trips. Department heads must ask, does the benefit of this practice outweigh the cost.

Obviously, police officers need to work overtime on occasion: often they have to appear in court on their day off; get called in early when another officer goes home sick; to attend training on their days off; handle an emergency or process an arrested offender in jail after their shift has ended; or meet with a witness on their day off. However, based on discussions with officers and sergeants and a review of payroll and scheduling documents, most overtime of this department is due to backfilling entire shifts for positions (officers) that were on leave or positions that were vacant to bring the on-duty force up to minimum staffing level, however that term is defined.

MGT reviewed employee timesheets and overtime accounting forms to see what it could learn about overtime. Here are some of our conclusions:

- Timesheets and overtime forms all appear to be approved by the same person. There is no supervisor's initials or signature for each separate occurrence of overtime. All documents appear to be initialed by the same person, most likely at end of the month when forms are sent to payroll. If shift supervisors who are requesting overtime are not indicating that request on some form of documentation, how can anyone be accountable for the level of overtime used or any effort to make improvements?

- 12-hour blocks of overtime are common. One officer worked five 12-hour blocks in a 15 day period. Consistent hours by blocks equivalent to an entire 12-hour shift indicate little thought is given to what the shift actually needs in the way of manpower or the policy directive to avoid overtime. Given the low amount of calls for service at many times of the day, as indicated earlier in this chapter, this apparent lack of discretion, which could be used to avoid overtime, is even more puzzling.
- There are numerous timesheets in which times time figures have been erased or changed with no explanation as to why these changes.
- The category of “general overtime” does not provide enough information. Is it to meet minimum staffing requirements or to fill every position vacant regardless of minimum staffing level? Is it because of a major event? Does it include activity at the end of a shift that requires staying over for a period of time? Without knowing why overtime is being used, how can police leadership understand how to deal with it?
- There are many examples of overtime paid when within the same week, either before, after or even on a day overtime is earned, that the employee takes leave time. For example, one officer showed eight regular hours worked and four hours on leave but also had six overtime hours the same day.

Overtime is not being avoided, contrary to policy, and the control of it is not a priority for the department.

The need for overtime is understood for a first responder organization like a police department that has many mission critical responsibilities that require people filling many of its positions 24/7, but not every position on every shift is mission critical.

RECOMMENDATION 4-10:

The chief of police should make controlling overtime expenditures a priority.

He should hold shift supervisors responsible for all overtime on their watch. Supervisors should be required to sign all time sheets for each period with overtime, or better still develop a new form to tract overtime to each responsible individual on a shift and have supervisor and commander sign. Eliminating or revising practices regarding trips to Seattle for new vehicle purchases should also be considered.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, minimum staffing requirements should be better defined and supervisors should be able to have more discretion regarding filling. The City of El Paso, Texas for example, gained control of excessive use of overtime by the chief of police declaring “no overtime”. Overtime was virtually eliminated. Other than mission critical functions for which real mission critical staffing was essential, overtime was not allowed. A similar no overtime policy was implement in Maricopa County Arizona, with similar results.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with command staff, should review the current staffing and deployment models to identify opportunities for a reduction in overtime. March/April 2012
2. Once opportunities are identified, reduction should be made through changes in deployment practices and scheduling practices. April 2012
3. A review of changes to the deployment/scheduling models and its overall effect on both cost savings and crime reduction should be reviewed at some time in the future. October 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be implemented with existing department resources. When accounting for the amount of uncommitted time currently observed by the consultant (see Recommendation 4-7), the department has an opportunity to save a number of man hours equal to that of two full-time patrol officer positions. However, in lieu of a reduction in work force, the recent use of overtime could be drastically reduced. By reducing current overtime expenditures by 80 percent, a savings of approximately \$178,500 could be achieved by the department.⁴

Policies that Contribute to Excessive Use of Overtime

Other issues that may contribute to the excessive use of overtime or excessive costs were found in the city's agreement with the officer guild. The city pays overtime or gives compensatory time at 1.5 times the regular hourly rate based on *hours paid* in a pay period and not *hours worked*. This exceeds the federal FLSA requirements that only required the 1.5 times premium when hours "worked" exceed the limit. This provision is not uncommon in law enforcement labor agreements; and is noted here should cost savings issues become more important as city revenues slow, and could be considered at the next labor negotiations.

What is unclear in the agreement and in practice is how sick leave is considered. The agreement states, "Vacation time taken shall be considered to be hours worked in order to obtain overtime." We could find no mention of sick leave or compensatory time taken to determine which overtime rate is to be considered.

⁴ This figure is based on overtime savings for patrol officers only for the fiscal year 2010, in which patrol officer overtime was \$223,114. Again, this figure does not include any savings for sergeant overtime, which in 2010 was equal to \$143,476.

If the 1.5 rate for overtime is used in all of the above circumstances, the practices observed would be contributing to the excess costs of overtime paid by the city. Officers and sergeants may only work 48 hours in an 8-day period, but could be earning overtime on some of the days by being off one day in the period and working another at a premium rate. MGT's review of timesheets indicates in 38 percent of the time police officers and 62 percent of time sergeants earned overtime when they had leave time in the same pay period, either just before or after their leave or, in some cases, the same day they earned overtime or were earning overtime within a block of leave days.

Sick Leave Accrual

An additional issue currently adding to increased overtime expenditures is the manner in which sick leave is used and figured, for purposes of overtime calculation, per the current collective bargaining agreement between the city and the officer guild. When compressed work weeks are used (less than five days worked in a seven day period), hours per day are increased from 8 to 10, 11, or 12. Sick leave is accrued at a rate of eight hours per month but only for the eight hour employees. "Sick leave accrual for ten (10) and twelve (12) hour shift personnel will be ten (10) and twelve (12) per month, respectively." The support staff agreement is similar in that it states that employees shall accrue sick leave at a rate of one shift per month. Therefore, 10-hour employees accrue 10 hours and 11-hour employees accrue 11 hours. This policy drives up costs by having some employees receiving 96 hours in a year for sick leave while other get 120, 132, or 144 hours. Leave time in the form of days or hours off, overtime to cover days/hours off, and dollars to buy-back leave time can cost the city money.

Typically, agencies that have compressed work weeks keep all leave earning at the same rate as 8-hour employees (8 hours of sick leave per month), so the annual rate is the same, 96 hours per year) for all employees. Just because someone works 12-hour days should not entitle one to earn 50 percent more sick leave in a year than a co-worker. If it were so, a case could be made that they should accrue fewer hours because they work few days in a month.

In addition to the way sick leave is calculated, the current guild contract allows officers to use both sick and vacation time in the same week overtime is accumulated. Therefore, an officer could work a

period that is equal to or less than regular time and still accrue overtime, because overtime is determined by hours scheduled, not hours worked. This is possible because of the current labor agreement.

RECOMMENDATION 4-11:

Policies that allow for disparate rates of sick time accrual should be reviewed and reevaluated in the next contract negotiation to ensure all employees earn an equal share of overtime, irrespective of schedule.

RECOMMENDATION 4-12:

Policies that allow for the use of leave time, while accruing overtime at a premium rate should be reviewed and reevaluated in the next contract negotiation.

Although the practice of allowing for the use of both sick time and vacation time in a particular work week to accrue overtime pay is common throughout the United States, in lean economic times when cities are faced with mounting expenditures and dwindling revenue sources, all options to save money should be reviewed and reevaluated to ensure economic viability for Sunnyside. This includes the current labor agreement provision that allows for the use of both sick time and overtime to accrue overtime in a given pay period.

At some point in time in the past, the City of Austin, Texas, and its police union reached a compromise by which sick time, which was deemed non-productive time, could not be used to accrue overtime, while vacation time, which was deemed productive time, could be used to accrue overtime. While this change was not wholly favorable to the city or the officers' interest, the compromise was favorable to the overall economic viability of the city, and in turn, the police department.

The same is true for the City of Sunnyside. While it is a significant benefit to the officer when they are permitted to use both sick time and vacation time, while accruing overtime pay, the practice of doing such is costing the city substantially. In renegotiating the terms of the labor agreement to preclude the use of sick time to accrue overtime, the city could save a significant amount of its current overtime expenditure, while providing for the current roster of officers.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with command staff, should review current scheduling practices to ascertain the use of sick time and vacation time while accruing overtime.

March/April
2012

4 Patrol Operations

2. If it is determined that the discontinuation of such practices would net a cost savings, the chief of police should work with the city's current legal representation in preparation for the next labor agreement negotiation. On-going
3. At such time the labor agreement for the police department is renegotiated, a change from time scheduled to time worked in calculating overtime should be renegotiated. Next labor agreement negotiation

FISCAL IMPACT

This could be implemented with existing city resources and should result in a reduced cost of overtime. Currently officers can use either sick time or vacation time in a given week and still accrue overtime at a premium rate. A change in such practices could result in substantial savings to the city.

Alarm Service

The City of Sunnyside Police Department monitors alarms for citizens of the city based on a policy adopted more than 20 years ago. As of August 2011, the SSPD had 108 alarm subscribers who are billed \$120.00 per year for the service. Alarms are monitored by the SSPD police dispatchers, who will dispatch patrol officers upon receipt of an alarm notification from the dispatch center.

According to a recent study, 971 alarms were dispatched in 2010, of which 762 were generated by the SSPD owned system. The others were from private alarm services. Of the 762 SSPD alarms, only one was an actual burglary. Five of the 209 alarm dispatches from subscribers of private alarm companies were actual burglaries. This is most likely due to private alarm companies calling subscribers first to determine the validity of the alarm before calling for a police dispatch. Whereas, SSPD dispatchers are generally too busy to call a subscriber first, and will just dispatch officers.

Of the 108 alarm subscribers, only 81 are current on their bills. Therefore, the department generates about \$10,000 per year in revenue. The cost for dedicated phone lines, maintenance of software, depreciation on hardware, and postage for billing is estimated to be more than \$2,700 per year. In addition, officers spend an estimated 482 hours responding to alarms, city staff spend time preparing bills and collecting receipts, and dispatchers spend time (estimated to be more than 1.5 hours per day) handling alarm calls for service and dealing with the alarm monitors.

FINDING

The police department’s provision of an alarm service is not cost-effective and competes with private enterprise. Moreover, it is not a typical police service or a core component of police services in most communities. The current equipment being used to operate the service is in dire need of replacement. To do so, it would cost the city approximately \$15,000, while the average annual revenue generated from the service is approximately \$10,000.

RECOMMENDATION 4-13:

The SSPD should discontinue the provision of alarm services.

Although it would still dispatch officers upon notification from a private alarm company, the necessity to update its current equipment and the potential liability born of an alarm service does not justify the relatively small average annual revenue generated. While the service was being provided as a courtesy to Sunnyside citizens, there are numerous private alarm services that are competitive, if not superior, to Sunnyside’s alarm service. In addition to discontinuing its alarm service, the city should establish an alarm permit fee of \$25 per year and a false alarm charge after two false alarms in a six month period.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

- | | |
|--|------------------------|
| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with the city manager, should identify a plan by which the current alarm service will be phased out. | March/April
2012 |
| 2. Once such a plan is identified, the plan should be implemented and communicated to the city’s citizens and current alarm service customers. | May – November
2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

The loss of \$10,000 in revenue should be minimized by avoidance of certain expenditures for dedicated phone lines, software, and maintenance for the alarm system, and amortization of the alarm receiver, and revenues from alarm permits and some false alarm fees. In addition, patrol officers would save hundreds of hours in false alarm responses and dispatchers in handling alarm calls.

Data Limitations

The majority of data for this project were extracted from SSPD's computer-aided dispatch system. This data came in the form of time stamps associated with certain actions: when the unit was en route, when the unit arrived on scene, and when the unit completed the call. All actions had the time stamp for when the incident was first reported. This configuration did not allow for analysis of activity taken after the unit had arrived, such as number of cases in which the unit transported prisoners or having to go to multiple scenes.

The most significant issue was the priority level of the incidents. The SOP specified three priority levels, but the CAD data contained nine (1-7, 9, and "\") as well as having a significant number of incidents that did not have a priority level. The majority of incidents had priority levels 1 to 5 or no priority level. Sometimes priorities were automatically assigned, and sometimes they were assigned by the dispatchers. MGT was informed that sometimes the dispatchers assigned a priority level 5 to the highest level incidents, when the SOP (and presumably the automation) indicated that priority level 1 incidents were the highest level. Consequently, MGT staff had to recode priority levels, changing serious offenses labeled as priority 5s into priority 1s, and less serious offenses labeled as priority 1s into priority 5s, and similar actions for priority 2s and 4s; since priority 3 is in the middle of the scale, it was not necessary to recode any of those incidents. MGT used conservative assessments of serious vs. nonserious offenses, so there could be some errors in recoded priority levels.

Furthermore, it was not clear which incidents were initiated by the citizens. MGT used the following rules to determine which incidents were citizen-initiated: the first action was en route, the second action was arrived, the dispatch time took longer than one minute but less than an hour (see the next paragraph for the reason why), and the drive time was longer than 15 seconds, but less than 15 minutes. All other incidents were considered officer-initiated or previously scheduled. It is possible that this definition introduced error into the analyses.

Some less serious incidents appeared to be dispatched one day and acted on the next day. In order not to count between shift times on the call in the total time used by patrol officers, any action that took longer than 10 hours was not included in the total.

5 SUPPORT

Investigations

The Investigations Unit currently has two detectives; a L.E.A.D. detective and a detective sergeant. Although the detectives are generalists, the dramatic spike of homicides in 2010 has required the detectives to assume a primary role as homicide detectives¹. As a result, patrol officers have assumed a large part of the department's caseload, including other major crimes. For 2010, the Investigations Unit was responsible for approximately 8 percent of the total cases for the year. **Exhibit 5-1** provides an account of the number of cases for which each officer is responsible.

EXHIBIT 5-1
Sunnyside Police Department
Officer Caseload, 2010

Officer	Function	# of Cases	% of Total
Orth, T	Patrol Officer	1021	8.78%
Russell, A	Patrol Officer	930	8.00%
Prieto, J	Patrol Officer	782	6.73%
Bailey, S	Patrol Sergeant	744	6.40%
Gusby, J.E.	Patrol Officer	740	6.37%
Coffman, K	Patrol Sergeant	732	6.30%
Orate, S	Patrol Officer	689	5.93%
Hernandez, O	Patrol Sergeant	667	5.74%
Bruso, R	Patrol Officer	618	5.32%
Lemmon, S	Patrol Officer	581	5.00%
Reihs, S	Animal Control Officer	535	4.60%
Chumley, J	Detective Sergeant	453	3.90%
Rodriguez, M	Patrol Officer	412	3.54%
Layman, R	Detective	404	3.48%
Ramos, S	SRO	397	3.42%
Sparks, C	Patrol Officer	389	3.35%
Ortiz, J	Patrol Officer	333	2.86%
Rodrigues, S	HUD Officer	210	1.81%
Kramer, M	Patrol Officer	177	1.52%
Glossen, J	SRO Sergeant	154	1.32%

¹ When asked about the work of the investigations unit, the deputy chief asserted that as a result of the increase in homicides in 2010, his investigations unit was essentially a "homicide unit."

EXHIBIT 5-1 (continued)
Sunnyside Police Department
Officer Caseload, 2010

Officer	Function	# of Cases	% of Total
Rivas, M	Patrol Officer	126	1.08%
Tucker, J	Patrol Officer	62	0.53%
<i>Harris, B</i>	<i>Reservist</i>	58	0.50%
Cunningham, J	Patrol Officer	50	0.43%
Rollinger, E	Detective	48	0.41%
<i>Scherer, L</i>	<i>Reservist</i>	40	0.34%
Radder, E	Chief	39	0.34%
<i>Desmarais, E</i>	<i>Reservist</i>	35	0.30%
Scott, D	Detective	28	0.24%
<i>Slavens, L</i>	<i>Reservist</i>	20	0.17%
Ausland, M	Patrol Officer	19	0.16%
Christensen, M	Hospital Officer	18	0.15%
<i>Messmore, L</i>	<i>Reservist</i>	9	0.08%
Garza, P	Corrections Officer	8	0.07%
Orth, J	Hospital Officer	7	0.06%
Schenck, P	Deputy Chief	7	0.06%
Rivard, J	Code Enforcement	5	0.04%
Martinez, A	Hospital Officer	3	0.03%
Prieto, J	Corrections Officer	3	0.03%
Williams, J	Patrol Officer	3	0.03%
Emineth, B	Patrol Officer	2	0.02%
Valdez, L	Corrections Officer	2	0.02%
Driscoll, D	Hospital Officer	1	0.01%
Poteet, J	Patrol Officer	1	0.01%
Saenz, G	Corrections Officer	1	0.01%
Vialon, M	Dispatcher	1	0.01%
Yakima Sheriff		1	0.01%
Total Cases		11,625	

Source: Sunnyside Police Department, November 2011.

While the sergeant has carried a separate caseload in the past, the intent going forward is to remove this caseload and allow the sergeant to attend to the administration and management of the unit. To offset this transition, the department has developed a plan to assign a third detective to the unit, whose primary responsibility will be to handle cases involving gang activity. As such, the third detective will work closely with the gang unit, crime analyst, and gang intelligence officers.

Unlike patrol operations, it is more difficult to evaluate the resource needs of a criminal investigations unit. This is because the subjective and qualitative determinants of workload and work practices are more important. Moreover, as was stated previously, patrol officers handle a substantial number of cases, making the needs of the unit even more difficult to determine. For these reasons, comparisons with other agencies or the ability to determine a standard or norm is very difficult. Other factors that make comparative analyses difficult include:

- Varying approaches used to screen, assign, and monitor cases;
- The extent to which patrol performs investigations varies widely;
- Approach to investigating different crimes varies widely: standard interviewing procedures, use of telephone and in-person interviews, use and availability of technology; and
- Community needs and expectations is an important factor into what will be investigated and what will not.

With these factors in mind, the department needs to examine its investigative staffing requirements from a variety of perspectives in order to obtain an accurate overall evaluation of staffing issues and needs. The perspective from which the consulting team reviewed the department's investigative needs include the following:

- Case management practices as identified through interviews with staff;
- A review of cases currently being investigated by each detective;
- Additional work task assigned to detectives; and
- A comparison of investigators staffing, workload and the number of Part I crimes occurring in Sunnyside with other law enforcement agencies.

Investigative workloads vary depending on the number and types of cases a detective is assigned, their complexity and also the level of service desired by an agency. In law enforcement agencies that actively screen, assign, and review investigative caseloads there is a range of case workload that provides sufficient work but does not overwhelm the investigator. In conducting this analysis of investigative staffing needs for the department, the following assumptions were made:

- Supervisor (detective sergeant) will not be assigned a caseload going forward; rather the supervisor's role will be one of supervision, guidance to investigators and case management;
- There are currently two detectives available for case assignment;

- Patrol personnel carry a significant caseload, including both minor and serious cases; and
- The department currently has no formal case management system.

To ascertain a baseline workload figure, the consulting team used the average number of Part I offenses per full-time investigator as reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The consulting team uses Part I offenses as a measure based on the consistency by which these crimes are reported throughout the United States. Based on previous analysis, the range of Part I offenses per investigator average approximately 400 to 500 cases annually. Moreover, despite a communicated desire to discontinue the practice, cases were assigned to the investigative sergeant in 2010. Therefore, when calculating Part I offenses per full-time investigator, three investigators were used to determine this figure. The following chart provides an account of the total number of Part I crimes per investigator, as reported to the FBI, in the last three years.

EXHIBIT 5-2
Sunnyside Part I Crimes
2008 -2010

Sunnyside Index Crimes	2008	2009	2010
Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	2	1	6
Forcible rape	2	2	7
Robbery	14	12	12
Aggravated assault	23	18	27
Total Violent Crimes	41	33	52
Burglary	260	255	188
Larceny-theft	603	461	450
Motor vehicle theft	266	139	86
Arson	9	8	2
Total Property Crimes	1,138	863	726
Total Crimes	1,179	896	778
<i>Cases per Investigator</i>	<i>393</i>	<i>299</i>	<i>259</i>

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigations, Uniform Crime Report, 2011.

However, in light of the significant caseload carried by patrol officers, **Exhibit 5-3** provides a detail of actual Part I offenses per full-time investigator, as reported by the department.

EXHIBIT 5-3
Sunnyside Part I Crimes Actually Assigned to Investigators
2010

Sunnyside Index Crimes	2010
Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	6
Forcible rape	3
Robbery	2
Aggravated assault	15
Total Violent Crimes	26
Burglary	27
Larceny-theft	41
Motor vehicle theft	6
Arson	1
Total Property Crimes	75
Total Crimes	101
<i>Actual Cases per Investigator</i>	<i>34</i>

Source: Sunnyside Police Department, September 2011.

FINDING

Although the two detectives assigned to the investigation unit are generalists, many, including the deputy chief, exclaimed this investigation unit to be a “homicide unit.” This is a result of the six homicides in 2010. Upon further inquiry, the status of the six homicide cases is as follows:

1. Homicide 1: gang-member shot and killed a non-gang affiliated child; suspect convicted to 27 years;
2. Homicide 2: two-year old was beatem to death by mom’s boyfriend, suspect in custody; preparing for trial;
3. Homicide 3: although believed to have no affiliation with local gang members, cartel related homicide at local restaurant; six suspects – active, seeking extradition but evidence is weak;
4. Homicide 4: work related argument between two co-workers; preparing for trial;
5. Homicide 5: gang related; active case, but weak evidence; and
6. Homicide 6: gang related, active.

As a result of the six identified cases, the department reported that its current detectives have very little time to investigate other major crimes, much less minor crimes or property crimes. However, as **Exhibit 5-2** shows that in the last three years the average Part I crimes per detective has declined from a high of 393 Part I crimes per detective to 259 Part I crimes per detective in 2011.

As such, most patrol officers reported to be carrying their own caseload, with several carrying sexual assault crimes, including rape, and other major crimes. When asked when there was time for the proper investigation of these cases, many reported attempts to conduct investigations in between responding to calls. Therefore, when accounting for the caseloads carried by patrol officers, this figure is even lower. See **Exhibit 5-1**.

The investigations unit does not currently employ a case management program by which all cases are tracked. Moreover, as stated previously, patrol officers carry their own caseload; however, there is process by which these cases are entered into a system for review and assignment based on expertise or current workload. The responding patrol officer is automatically assigned a case and is then expected to self-monitor the case to its completion.

RECOMMENDATION 5-1:

Prior to assigning a third detective, the department should employ Spillman Technologies case management software to arrive at useful data to accurately measure investigative workload and the need for additional resources.

There are two basic approaches to staffing investigations units: workload and comparative. For comparative purposes, the number of investigators to full-time sworn personnel is assessed; with an average measure of 10 to 15 percent of its total sworn force being detectives.² Using this approach and accounting for the newest recruit, the number of investigators appropriate for the Sunnyside Police Department is between 3 and 4.5.

The second approach to staffing investigations units is the workload approach. For the workload approach, caseloads are analyzed for closure and the average amount of time to process the case. This approach is usually the preferred way to measure the staffing requirements for an agency's investigative unit. However, a department must define explicit goals for certain types of cases, built on historical data on the average time to complete the types of cases.

In the case of Sunnyside, it is difficult to surmise the percent of investigators to total sworn force in light of the heavy caseload that the patrol officers carry. Therefore, although the department currently

² *Enforcement Program Staffing Needs Requirements*, presented to the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife, THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, December 2008 at 44.

employs two detectives, the number of man hours dedicated to investigations is far more than two FTE. Moreover, as discussed previously, the latest comparison of Part I crimes to detectives yielded an average Part I crime to investigator (389/investigator), far lower than the average (400-500/investigator).

To define such goals based on historical data, a department will usually employ a case management system by which cases are tracked for closure time. Sunnyside should employ the case management module for the Spillman RMS System. By doing so, the department could acquire useful data, by which workload goals could be established and a true measure of staffing need determined.

In addition to identifying a true measure of the department's investigative needs, the department could begin to identify those major crimes currently being investigated by patrol officers and shift them back to the detectives for investigations. Although the department suggested that a large contingency of cases worked by patrol officers are a result of the surge of homicides in 2010. However, a careful review of current case activity indicated that several of the homicide investigations are either solved or cold. Moreover, by implementing a true case management system, the investigations sergeant will have a true ability to review, assign, and monitor for outcome.

To assign and track all cases, the department should employ the case management module for the Spillman RMS System. According to the company the module will "track assigned cases, solvability scores, time spent, notes, and actions to be taken." Moreover, the module will allow the sergeant to "create reports that show each investigator's workload and how much time your agency has spent on specific cases."³

By employing the Spillman case management system, the department can gather time-consumption data in reference to a particular investigation from the beginning of the case assignment to completion. The ability to do this will allow the department to monitor the effectiveness of its officers in investigating and managing caseloads and allow for an accurate determination of the staffing needs of the department in terms of investigations workload.

³ See <http://www.spillman.com/police/investigations/> (last viewed on November 22, 2011).

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

- | | |
|---|---------------------|
| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with the deputy chief and the detective sergeant, should review available case management software. | March/April
2012 |
| 2. Once appropriate software has been identified, the detective sergeant, detectives, and patrol should be properly and thoroughly trained on new case management software. | May – July
2012 |
| 3. Once properly trained, the new software should be implemented and the intake and progress of all cases monitored by both detective sergeant, and when appropriate, patrol sergeants. | August 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

The fiscal impact cannot be estimated. The cost, if any, of software would likely be more than offset through the more efficient use of officer time through the management of caseloads. Moreover, the implementation of a case-management software would allow the department to better understand the current workload of its officers and provide hard data, by which the department can make more informed decisions regarding the need for staff going forward.

RECOMMENDATION 5-2:

The detective sergeant should review and assign all cases as they arise.

Once a case management system is implemented, the detective sergeant can review for solvability, assign to an appropriate officer, and monitor for completion. First and foremost, it is important that the detective sergeant review a case to assess its potential for solvability. In doing such, it will help prevent the department from allowing its officers to waste time on impossible cases, while focusing its resources on those cases most likely to be solved. For example, the detective sergeant can review the case to determine if a suspect has been identified. It has been said that the most important factor for solving a crime is the identification of a suspect by the public; therefore, without such identification from the public, the chances of solving any given crime fall to nearly 10 percent.⁴

In addition to gaining the ability to accurately focus the limited resources of the department, the sergeant could also assess data to identify the types of cases investigated, so as to ensure the department provides the most appropriate training for its investigators and patrol officers. In addition, the sergeant can evaluate the true workload of his/her staff through number and type of cases assigned, time to investigate, and final disposition. By doing this, solid benchmarks and performance measures could be

⁴ Anthony A. Braga, Edward A. Flynn, George L. Kelling, Christine M. Cole, Moving the Work of Criminal Investigators Towards Crime Control, Harvard Kennedy School and National Institute of Justice March 2011 at 5.

established to allow the department to make more reliable resource needs in the future. Lastly, the constant monitoring of cases creates a level of accountability that will likely produce more positive outcomes for more cases.

In addition to managing the cases of his/her detectives, the detective sergeant also should work with patrol sergeants to ensure those cases assigned to patrol officers are completed in a timely manner. Many of the officers were unable to provide an accurate count of the cases they were responsible for investigating. Moreover, the officers confirmed that work on those cases is accomplished on an ad hoc basis, as their primary patrol duties allow.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

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|---|---------------------|
| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with the deputy chief and the detective sergeant, should review available case management software. | March/April
2012 |
| 2. Once appropriate software has been identified, the detective sergeant, detectives, and patrol should be properly and thoroughly trained on new case management software. | May – July 2012 |
| 3. Once properly trained, the new software should be implemented and the intake and progress of all cases monitored by both detective sergeant, and when appropriate, patrol sergeants. | August 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

Excluding the cost of the necessary software that would allow the detective sergeant to achieve this recommendation, this recommendation can be implemented with existing resources.

FINDING

Barring unusual circumstances or the need for highly technical tools provided by the Washington State Police Crime Lab, detectives and patrol officers are required to process a crime scene. If the crime warrants the call-out of detectives, upon arrival, a determination is made as to which detective will take the lead. Once this determination is made, the detective to which a case is assigned processes the crime scene using the tools available to him or her from the small kit carried in their unit. When the crime is deemed not to warrant call-out of a detective, a patrol officer is required to process the crime scene using the same basic tools, which are transported in a small kit in the officer’s unit.

RECOMMENDATION 5-3:

The department should establish a crime scene response plan from which a determination can be made as to the resources necessary to work a crime scene.

Currently patrol officers and detectives handle most crime scene investigations, including homicides. On occasion, the Washington State Patrol will be involved to provide a certain level of technical expertise or equipment. Otherwise, the officers and detectives employ a minimal level of training (for officers, what is received in the academy, and for detectives, an additional 40 hour basic CSI course). Moreover, a dedicated CSI vehicle equipped with all the necessary supplies should be outfitted and available for call-out for major crime scene investigations. The need for such a vehicle to respond can also be determined by the crime scene response plan.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

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|--|---------------------|
| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with the deputy chief and the detective sergeant, should review the types of crime scenes most commonly handled by its department personnel. | March/April
2012 |
| 2. In doing such, and again in consultation with appropriate personnel, the chief of police should determine the needs of the department depending upon type of crime scene. | March/April
2012 |
| 3. From this, the chief should develop a written policy from which the department operates when responding to a crime scene. | May 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources. However, if through careful review, it is determined that a dedicated CSI vehicle is required, the cost of this recommendation would include the cost of outfitting said vehicle. It was brought to the consultant’s attention, that there is an existing vehicle in the department’s current fleet that could serve as a dedicated CSI vehicle. If this is the case, by employing this vehicle, the cost of this recommendation would be reduced to the cost of any additional tools not currently held by the department to properly outfit said vehicle.

Records

Currently, the department employs a full-time non-sworn data entry clerk to enter reports, cases, and citations into the Records Management System (RMS), which is currently operating on the Spillman platform, version 6.0. Spillman is widely used as integrated public safety software which supports the needs of the various functions in the department, including both law enforcement and corrections. A majority of the data entry clerk’s work entails reviewing cases or reports once entered by an officer;

however, it was reported that there is still at least one officer who hand writes reports and cases manually, which then requires the data-entry clerk to enter the data into the RMS. In addition to entering and reviewing records and case files, the data entry clerk responds to public requests for any cases or reports.

Having only recently joined the department, the data entry clerk reported that a majority of her time, until very recently, has been dedicated to attending to a very large backlog of reports that require entry and/or review. However, as a result of hard work and assistance from members of the department, the backlog has largely been addressed.

The department has recently transitioned from the summary-based Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system to the more detailed National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS). To satisfy the reporting requirements for NIBRS, officers are required to reference each report to complete a corresponding entry into the NIBRS database. To do this, it was communicated that an officer would complete a report, print the report, and reference the report to re-enter all required fields in the NIBRS database. The data entry clerk does not manage this reporting activity and it was unclear who reviews and/manages the NIBRS reporting process from initial entry to review and submission.

FINDING

No one person seems to be charged with overall management of the records management system. This includes reporting of NIBRS data. As such, the data entry clerk reported a significant backlog existed when she was hired; however, since then, she indicated the backlog has been substantially reduced if not eliminated all together. In addition to data entry and NIBRS reporting, many officers reported a process in which the need for double entry of incident data is necessary. More specifically, several officers indicated a process in which the pertinent information would need to be entered into Spillman, a paper copy would then be printed and the information would then need to be re-entered into the NIBRS database.

RECOMMENDATION 5-4:

The department should conduct an internal audit of the reported backlog of records and cases.

Much of the information contained in records and cases provide time-sensitive information that can be used to reduce future criminal activity. Moreover, the information is often sensitive and therefore,

subject to state and federal laws. Lastly, NIBRS provides its own set of requirements in terms of the way information is reported. To ensure the department is in compliance with all applicable state and federal laws, a comprehensive internal review or audit should be conducted so as to ensure the department either remains in compliance, or in the event it is currently not in compliance, it comes into compliance quickly and without issue.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the deputy chief, should work with data entry personnel to review any existing backlog and perform audit of any such backlog. March 2012
2. If necessary, daytime dispatch should be provided at least minimal training on Spillman and NIBRS, so as to provide assistance to the data entry personnel. April 2012
3. Using data entry personnel, a report of such an audit should be submitted to appropriate personnel and action taken to minimize any potential issues that may arise from such a backlog. April 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources.

RECOMMENDATION 5-5:

Current RMS system should be integrated with NIBRS to facilitate faster reporting and decrease the need for double entry.

Many officers report that generating reports requires a significant portion of their time. And while this is unavoidable to a certain extent, the need to double enter information from the Spillman system to NIBRS creates a redundancy that should be avoided, allowing officers to spend more of their limited time in the community.

Spillman Technologies reports that detailed crime summaries and activity information such as offenses, arrests, and law incidents can be compiled and submitted electronically to NIBRS.⁵ The department should work with Spillman Technologies to identify ways in which the current RMS can better serve the needs of NIBRS reporting without the additional man hours currently used for double entry.

⁵ See http://www.spillman.com/media/PDF_software_module/Law_Records_With_UCR_NIBRS_Spec_Sheet_Web.pdf (last viewed on November 17, 2011)

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the deputy chief, should consult with Spillman Technologies to identify ways that would minimize the need for duplicate entry into both Spillman and NIBRS. March/April 2012
2. Where ways to minimize duplication are found, these ways should be implemented by way of systems and policies so as to reduce the time required by officers to complete paperwork. May - July 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources. However, there is a potential cost savings (efficiency gain) by minimizing the need to duplicate entries into the two systems, officers will be required to allocate less time to paperwork and more time to patrol.

FINDING

Upon hiring a crime analyst and establishing the gang unit, the department began to compile information in an effort to establish a gang database. Currently, the department is compiling information regarding known and suspected gang members through field intelligence and background investigation conducted by the crime analyst. Through these efforts, several individuals in the Spillman system have been flagged as gang members. The information used to flag individuals has been stored in a locked file cabinet.

When asked, there were several accounts of how the new gang database is being compiled and administered. By most accounts, the database, which is primarily print based hard copy, is stored in a lock file cabinet located in the crime analyst's office and the information is being entered into Spillman as time allows. Moreover, it was widely held that information for both juveniles and adults is co-located and civilians and sworn staff from multiple agencies could access the information entered into Spillman. Lastly, it was unclear as to the existence of a process by which dated information was or will be purged from the database.

RECOMMENDATION 5-6:

A formal process should be implemented for establishing the gang database.

As is the case with many effective crime fighting tools, a gang database is rife with potential legal issues and is controlled by various state and federal laws. As such, the department also should ensure the necessary mechanisms are in place to protect civil rights and other privacy concerns.⁶ This includes ensuring that the database is audited properly and purged accordingly, access is monitored and controlled, and the information entered into the database is guided by established standards concerning juvenile/adult rules and gang member identification standards.

Moreover, information and data is a critical tool for law enforcement; therefore, a comprehensive, yet accurate gang database is an essential tool to ensure the department achieves the objectives of its gang strategy. To ensure this is the case, careful thought and planning should go into the initial development and deployment of the gang database.

In lieu of developing a custom gang database or borrowing from the existing resources of Spillman, the department should consider using an existing off-the-shelf system such as GangNet. GangNet is a user friendly browser-based investigations, analytical, and statistical resource for recording and tracking gang members, gang associates, and their activities. Used by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, GangNet provides gang, gang member, and gang incidents tracking in order to identify trends, patterns, relationships, and changes to overall gang demographics.⁷

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the deputy chief, crime analyst, and the gang unit, should identify the needs of Sunnyside in the context of an electronic gang database. March 2012
2. Once needs are identified, Sunnyside should consult with area law enforcement agencies to ensure synergy between its gang database, and surrounding law enforcement agencies, including Yakima County. April – June
2012
3. Once needs of both Sunnyside and surrounding law enforcement agencies are surmised, a written policy should be implemented for creating and populating said gang database. July/August 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources.

⁶ See R.C.W. 43.43.762 (2011)

⁷ See <http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/pia/privacy-impact-assessment-gangnet.pdf> (last viewed on December 1, 2011).

Crime Analyst - Use of Intelligence

In reaction to an increase in violent crime and gang activity, the department created and implemented a “Gang Elimination Strategy.” The strategy is said to be based on the U.S. military’s counter-insurgency models employed in both the current war in Afghanistan as well as the recent war in Iraq. The department’s reasoning for employing such a model is, in part, founded on its disbelief that the more widely regarded Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s (OJJDP) model will not meet the critical needs of the community as they relate to gang issues. More specifically, the department indicated that in light of the scourge of gang activity throughout the community, there are no resources for prevention, intervention, and re-entry; rather, the department has indicated that the most appropriate use of its limited resources is for suppression. As such, the department’s “Gang Elimination Strategy” is comprised of the following five components:

- Political interagency support: to ensure city-wide buy-in and therefore succeed in its anti-gang efforts, the department will require the engagement of other/all city departments.
- Design organization toward intelligence: the department has employed various resources to collect and organize data in order to disseminate useful information department-wide to allow its personnel to engage in targeted law enforcement.
- Security: provide a level of safety to the citizens and businesses of Sunnyside through an increased presence.
- Public relations: incubate a sentiment throughout the community that gangs can be eliminated.
- Offensive operations: through the deployment of gang intelligence officers, gang officers, and a crime analyst, the following objectives will be accomplished:
 - Destruction of support networks, including employers and family members
 - Deny sanctuary through displacing gang members and affiliates
 - Marginalize through displacement and arrest

One of the ways in which the department is implementing this plan is the recent hire of a crime analyst. Initially, the analyst worked closely with the newly created gang unit to collect a large amount of information on suspected and known gang offenders. In addition to actively collecting information through the deployment of inventive investigative techniques, the analyst also enters information gathered through the completion of field information into the Spillman database. If certain criteria are met, as

established by the state of Washington, an individual will be flagged as a known gang member. She is then able to provide this information to the gang unit, who uses such information to effectively serve warrants on these individuals. To date, she reports that she has had no opportunity to provide tactical analysis for patrol or investigations; however, as the deputy chief ramps up the implementation of CompStat, it is likely that the analyst will be asked by untrained sergeants to provide data and other assistance in order to address the needs of the CompStat program.

In addition to compiling information on gang members and affiliates, the analyst's use of threshold analysis has been helpful in achieving the department's objective of re-designing the organization toward an intelligence based approach to law enforcement. Through the use of various computer programs, including Excel, crystal reports, and ArcGOS, she has provided the deputy chief with relevant data and some analyses.

FINDING

As a part of the gang elimination strategy, the department recently implemented a CompStat model of analyzing and exchanging information and ideas based on crime data. To assist with this measure, the department recently received approval for, and hired, a crime analyst. Although the analyst has only been a member of the department for a short period of time, she is reported by most in the department to be very helpful in compiling information and assisting the department's efforts to find gang activity. Although her abilities are limited either by training or access to software, she anticipates that the proper software will be acquired and hopes for additional training in the future.

COMMENDATION 5-1:

Data is a strong tool for fighting crime. The recent addition of a crime analyst will help the department fight crime in a targeted way; therefore, ensuring the efficient use of its limited resources.

As stated above, the crime analyst has been a tremendous asset to the newly created gang unit to identify gang members and their affiliates. Her use of unconventional methods to obtain useful information concerning the activities and whereabouts of identified, documented gang members has allowed the two-man gang unit to focus its efforts on face to face time with known gang members and their affiliates. Moreover, the analyst has served as a central figure in building a gang database that will

continue to assist the department in its anti-gang efforts. As department gang efforts move forward, the department should expand her usefulness by providing a tactical crime analysis report to all members of the department.

To ensure the position's continued success, the department should work with the analyst to ensure she has the proper training and resources available to her. Resources include both staff participation and software. The department also should consider providing for a membership in the International Association of Crime Analysts (IACA). In addition to IACA's certification program for law enforcement crime analyst, such a membership also would provide her with training opportunities and expand the resources available to her and the department.

RECOMMENDATION 5-7:

The department should research the benefit of deploying the CompStat Dashboard module offered by Spillman Technologies.

Spillman Technologies currently has a module called CompStat Dashboard that may help the crime analyst provide an acceptable level of tactical crime analyses to patrol and investigation. Essentially, the module would allow patrol officers and sergeants to access relevant crime data, including simple analyses, on their MCT's and desktop computers. This would likely free up the crime analyst to engage in more useful long term planning and analyses. Spillman Technologies reports the following regarding this module:

The CompStat Dashboard module allows agencies to maximize Spillman software by calculating trends and patterns using information in the Spillman database, then presenting the information in an easy-to-analyze format. Agencies can use the dashboard to make informed decisions, monitor the health of their organizations, and compare statistics over time to improve public safety. Users can also view incidents on a Google Earth™ map to help determine crime hotspots.⁸

Although executive management mentioned Spillman Dashboard, few people, if any, had heard of it when asked about its utility. The module may be a useful tool for sergeants and officers as the department moves toward CompStat. Moreover, with proper access and training, the use of this module by sergeants will then free up the crime analyst for conducting more complex analysis.

⁸ See http://www.spillman.com/media/PDF_software_module/CompStat_Dashboard_Spec_Sheet_Web.pdf (last viewed on November 17, 2011)

As stated above, the crime analyst has been a tremendous asset to the newly created gang unit to identify gang members and their affiliates. Her use of unconventional methods to obtain useful information concerning the activities and whereabouts of identified, documented gang members has allowed the two-man gang unit to maximize its productivity. Moreover, the analyst has served as a central figure in building a gang database that will continue to assist the department in its anti-gang efforts. As department gang efforts move forward, the department should expand her usefulness by providing a tactical crime analysis report to all members of the department.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the deputy chief, the crime analyst, and patrol sergeants, should review Spillman's module – CompStat Dashboard. March 2012
2. If it is determined that the Dashboard would be a useful and effective tool for patrol officers, the module should be deployed. April 2012
3. All relevant department personnel should be properly trained on Dashboard, to ensure its effectiveness in the field May - September 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

Barring any additional cost for deploying the CompStat Dashboard module, this recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources.

Gang Unit

The gang unit was created in August of 2011 in response to an increase in gang activity in Sunnyside. The unit consists of two patrol officers and is supervised by the SRO Sergeant. Since its inception, the unit has worked closely with the crime analyst and gang intelligence officers to identify gang members and their affiliates throughout the community. To accomplish their mission, the gang unit's primary activity is the successful service of warrants on known gang members and their affiliates. Although the primary purpose for doing this is to allow for the arrest of gang members and their affiliates, a consequence of this approach provides for a heightened level of contact and presence in the community. Among the comparable agencies survey, Sunnyside's gang unit is unique among the survey group, although Hermiston, Oregon reported a gang enforcement officer.

FINDING

Although the gang unit has been identified as a critical and integral part of the department gang elimination strategy, there is very little documentation or formal planning as to how the gang unit should be structured, managed, operated, or the performance measures by which the impact of the gang unit can be determined. When asked about their objectives, the two officers recently assigned to the unit suggested that their objective was to effectuate as many arrest and make as many contacts with gang members and their affiliates as possible. Moreover, both confirmed that when the unit was first formed, they submitted weekly reports to the sergeant; however, this is no longer required. Moreover, there are no formal weekly meetings to discuss progress, strategy, and goals going forward.

RECOMMENDATION 5-8:

To reflect the importance of the gang unit in achieving its overall gang strategy, the department should establish procedures and performance measures in an effort to provide specific guidance to the gang unit so as to allow for a measure of its overall effectiveness.

If gang elimination is the single biggest priority of the department, the gang unit is at the center of this effort. Although the stated objective of the gang enforcement strategy is to eliminate all gang members and their affiliates through constant contact and arrest, there are currently no formal measures by which the effectiveness of this strategy can be measured and verified. This is also the case in regards to the communicated objectives of the gang unit. When asked by the consulting team, members of the department stated the primary objective of the gang unit was to effectuate arrest and to make frequent contact with known and suspected gang members. By doing such, the gang unit, through collaboration with the crime analyst, would develop a comprehensive gang database to help focus the strategy and bring about its success. However, when asked of a formal mission, strategy, or other performance measures concerning the gang unit, neither the officers of the gang unit nor the command staff were able to provide such.

As is the case with the gang elimination strategy, the gang unit should collaborate with its sergeant and other relevant command staff to develop formal performance measures by which the activities of the gang unit can be monitored and its overall effectiveness measured. By doing such, the department will

ensure the success of the unit through constant communications regarding its mission, its achievements, and any necessary action or change to ensure the on-going success of the unit and the gang strategy.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the deputy chief, the commanding sergeant of the gang unit, and the gang unit, should identify appropriate performance measures for the gang unit. March – April 2012
2. The chief of police should consult with city manager and any interested council members to ensure performance measures reflect the intentions of the community. May 2012
3. Once input is received, the performance measures should be formally implemented and reviewed by both the commanding sergeant and the chief/deputy chief on a regular basis. June 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources.

RECOMMENDATION 5-9:

A formal technology-based system should be established to communicate relevant information obtained by patrol officers to the gang unit.

As a part of its overall gang strategy, the department appointed gang intelligence officers to each patrol shift. The objective was to allow for the rapid collection of data and intelligence on gang members and affiliates. However, much of the information is timely and only useful if communicated to the gang unit in a timeframe that will allow them to act on the information.

Currently, there is no formal system by which information is communicated by and between the gang unit and gang intelligence officers. The department should develop a formal system by which the information is communicated directly to the gang unit officers by end of a shift. By doing such, the department will help ensure that, to the extent possible, the department is able to effectively and efficiently act on relevant, actionable information.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the deputy chief and command staff, should identify a realistic, but effective way to achieve this recommendation. March 2012
2. Once identified, the process should be implemented. April 2012

3. Periodic review should be accomplished so as to ensure that useful information is being transmitted to gang unit in a timely manner so as to help the overall gang elimination strategy.

Ongoing

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources. However, the efficient transfer of data and information can help the department to act more effectively and provide an increase level of safety to those officers on the frontline.

Dispatch

Providing dispatch services for Sunnyside Police Department, the dispatch center includes four dedicated Sunnyside Police Department dispatchers operating on two 12-hour shifts. Because dispatch is co-located in the security control booth of the jail, dispatchers also act as the “eyes and ears” for corrections officers and manage access. Dispatchers are non-sworn personnel and members of the Teamsters Local 716. They currently work revolving 12-hour shifts with four consecutive days on followed by four consecutive days off. Corrections officers cover dispatcher duties during the dispatchers’ unpaid lunch hour and during their two paid break periods. There are currently only four dispatchers employed by Sunnyside Police Department to cover a 24/7 operation. This issue is covered in more detail in the chapter in this report dealing with the jail.

School Resource Officer

The department employs two full-time, fully commissioned school resource officers and a sergeant. As compared to its comparable agencies, SSPD employs at least one more SRO than any of the survey agencies. This is possible because the city is currently operating under an agreement with the Sunnyside school district by which the department provides school resource services to its schools in exchange for the provision of the officers’ pay, including benefits.

In addition to monitoring at-risk youth with known home issues, including abuse and drug addiction, the SROs report their emphasis is at the high school where they primarily respond to disputes among students and disrespect by and between students and school personnel. Often times, disputes are settled through a facilitated mediation by and between the involved students and the SRO. However, the SROs have reported an increase in arrest. While some of the SROs reported activities fall outside the

customary activities of small programs, many of the activities are consistent with other programs across the country.⁹

FINDING

Where many of the issues that arise were once considered mischief and misconduct to be handled by in-school disciplinary measures they are now characterized as a criminal offense, by which SROs are citing and arresting children. Discussions with officers revealed a belief that school administration is increasingly turning to their SRO officers to attend to disciplinary matters through the normal avenues available to law enforcement officers. However, executive leadership of the school district communicated a concern for the increased number of criminal matters that at one time would have been deemed disciplinary matters to be handled internally.

RECOMMENDATION 5-10:

The school district and SSPD should work as partners to address the growing disciplinary issues.

By virtue of the fact that school administrators and school resource officers implicated one another for the increased use of traditional law enforcement practices to address school disciplinary issues indicates a need for the school district and SSPD to work toward strengthening its partnership in the efforts against gangs. While the school reportedly supports the department's initiative against gangs, there is very little communication by and between the SSPD and the Sunnyside School District on how the gang initiative will impact the schools and vice versa. Involvement of the community, in particular the schools, is instrumental in ensuring the gang initiative succeeds. Moreover, strategies become more innovative as liaisons between schools are formed.¹⁰ Lastly, increased cooperation by the school aligns with one of the objectives of the gang initiation strategy, which is city-wide interagency cooperation.

An increased level of communication and dialogue by and between the SSPD and the school district can be achieved in many ways. Of the many ways, two obvious ways are scheduled, routine debriefings by and between the SSPD and the school district or re-aligning the reporting structure so that SSPD SROs report directly to school administration.

⁹ See Peter Finn and Jack McDevitt, National Association of School Resource Officer Programs Final Project Report, March 2005. (study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Justice)

¹⁰ *Community Policing Beyond the Big Cities*, Community Orientated Policing Services, U.S. Dept. of Justice, November 2004 at 2.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

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| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with the SRO sergeant, should work with the school district to identify useful reporting mechanisms by which the school can be fully informed of the department's activities and how the school district might help. | March 2012 |
| 2. After consultation, the SRO should establish a formal process, depending upon Step 1, by which the department regularly apprises the district of its activity as it relates to the school district. | April - May
2012 |
| 3. Regular meetings by and between the department should be established to ensure a continued partnership. | Ongoing |

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources.

RECOMMENDATION 5-11:

The SSPD should provide the necessary funds to ensure the continued participation of SROs in G.R.E.A.T training.

As a part of the gang elimination strategy, the SSPD indicated the need for community-wide buy-in and the participation of other agencies throughout the city. One of the ways this can be accomplished is to ensure continued training of the Sunnyside School District's SROs in the G.R.E.A.T (Gang Resistance Education and Training) program. Not only would this help strengthen the partnership of the school district and the SSPD, but it would allow for the SROs to engage in more education-based programs rather than law enforcement.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

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| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with the SRO sergeant, should identify the appropriate training. | March 2012 |
| 2. The appropriate officers should be provided appropriate training. | April 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

This fiscal impact of this recommendation would be that of the cost of training, which would include both the time required of the SRO (including overtime) and the basic cost of said training course. However, the training course is free and for those traveling more than 50 miles to attend the training, lodging is provided free of charge. Therefore, the direct cost of the training would be the actual travel, meals, and miscellaneous expenses. This cost could be further offset by any G.R.E.A.T. grant funds; therefore, the department is strongly urged to apply for any applicable G.R.E.A.T grants.

HUD Officer

There is currently a single officer whose primary responsibility is to respond to calls that occur on Housing Authority properties. His position is funded by a federal grant on a cost plus basis. Aside from responding to calls, the HUD officer is also tasked with creating block watches and helping to educate the tenants. The current HUD officer is one of the most tenured officers in the department and has a very strong relationship with the community. As such, in addition to the aforementioned duties, he acts as a school crossing guard and is very engaged with Sunnyside's senior community. In his position, he works with young children and their parents to steer them away from gang activity. The HUD officer is a positive addition to the force and provides balance to the current gang elimination strategy.

Hospital Officer/Security

There are currently five hospital officers employed by the Sunnyside Police Department. Similar to the SRO officers, while the hospital officers are employed by the department, the funding for their positions is fully funded by Sunnyside Hospital. The hospital officers are commissioned officers with limited jurisdiction, limited to the hospital and its grounds.

The hospital officers report directly to the deputy chief; however, all agree that most matters are handled by the five officers without involving the deputy chief. Moreover, the officers report a good relationship with the hospital employees and administration. As such, they feel more aligned with the hospital personnel than police department personnel.

FINDING

While all of the hospital officers reported very little need for supervision and reported very little need for interaction by and between the hospital officers and the deputy chief, the current organization structure suggests each of the five hospital officers reports directly to the deputy chief.

RECOMMENDATION 5-12:

The Sunnyside Police Department organizational structure should be re-aligned so that hospital officers are no longer a direct report to the deputy chief.

While the hospital reports that there is no need for a supervisor, the direct report of the five officers to the deputy chief is inappropriate. Therefore, the organization should be re-aligned so that the hospital officers report to a sergeant. While it is agreed that there is little need for supervision, at which time this does become necessary, supervision by a sergeant is more appropriate.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the city manager, should reorganize the police department; see Recommendation 3-1 of this report. March 2012
2. The chief of police should consult with hospital administration to ensure there are no objections to changes. April 2012
3. The chief of police should implement the new organizational structure. May 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

See fiscal impact as reported for Recommendation 3-1.

FINDING

The current contract provides for the provision of uniforms, including shoes and necessary equipment. Despite such provisions, many of the hospital personnel report issues with uniforms, including the process by which new uniforms are obtained. As a result, the officers report it is easier to use personal resources to procure needed uniforms.

RECOMMENDATION 5-13:

The process for uniform and equipment procurement/replacement should be reviewed to ensure that processes are in place that makes the replacement of uniforms efficient and effective for affected personnel.

Some hospital officers report that the process for ordering equipment and/or uniforms is too difficult; therefore, when new uniforms are required (including footwear), it is easier for the officers to procure necessary uniform items by using personal resources.¹¹ By agreement, the Sunnyside Police Department is to provide uniforms and footwear in accordance with their contract. This is an entitlement bargained for by hospital officers and should be honored employing the most efficient and effective process available.

¹¹ See Police Department Support Staff Agreement by and between City of Sunnyside, Washington and Teamsters Local 760, January 1, 2010 – December 31, 2014, Article 13.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the hospital officers' commander, should review current processes for the procurement of hospital personnel equipment. March 2012
2. Where necessary, the policies and procedures currently in place should be revised. April 2012
3. The newly revised policies and procedures should be implemented. May 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources. However, where some hospital officers now report procuring their own equipment to avoid the difficulties encountered with the current departmental process; should the newly revised policies and processes prove to be more efficient for hospital officers, the cost of this recommendation would be that of the equipment previously procured using the officers' personal resources.

Reserves

The Sunnyside Police Department operates a reserve officer program where citizens can apply, train, and respond as commissioned Sunnyside police officers. Currently the program has six officers: two sergeants, one corporal, and three officers. The program is currently managed by Patrol Officer Ramos.

While the reserve unit was at one time a strong program, its ranks have seen a significant reduction in recent years. As a result, the unit is reportedly in a rebuilding phase. There are currently five applicants in the third phase of the hiring process and two applicants in the second phase of the process.

As stated, the reserve officers, when called into active service, are fully commissioned officers with all the powers of the full-time commissioned officer. Each of the reserve officers is required to attend a six month reserve academy (a minimum of 246 hours) and complete an FTO program prior to participating as a fully commissioned reserve officer.

In addition to assisting in special events, the reserve unit serves at will and as their time allows. To do such, the officers will often report to the station and, provided a unit is available, check out a radio, and patrol the streets of Sunnyside. As all have full-time jobs in addition to their reserve activity, many report a preference for providing support and assistance on the weekend.

FINDING

The reserve unit is significantly smaller in rank than it has been historically. Although the department has reported a desire to grow the program back to its historical highs, officers in the unit report the department's failure to undertake the work necessary to hire and train the new recruits. There is a three phase process to recruiting reserve officers:

- Phase 1: Oral boards and written exam
- Phase 2: Polygraph
- Phase 3: Psychological review and background check

Delays have spanned several months and include the department's failure to follow-up with new recruits after successful completion of the oral boards and written exam.

SSPD's failure to dedicate the time and resources necessary to ensure a successful recruiting campaign reflects a general sense by the newer recruits that the department does not appreciate the dedication and time donated to assist the full-time members in conducting efficient law enforcement.

RECOMMENDATION 5-14:

SSPD should charge the commanding officer of the reserve program (or the new Community Support Sergeant, see Recommendation 3-1) to work closely with current reserve officers to ensure the successful re-staffing of its ranks.

Currently, there is an unofficial leader (most tenured) in the reserve corp. He has reportedly been tasked with the responsibility to rebuild the reserve program. To do this, the reserve unit supervisor should report to a supervisor within the department to ensure full engagement by the department. Currently, reserve officers report a failure by the department to ensure the timely completion of new recruit hiring process. The failure to ensure a timely hiring process sends a message to new reserve recruits that their participation is not important to the department. This perception makes it difficult for current reserves to effectively recruit. By fully engaging, the department will see a more successful rebuild of the reserve program.

In addition to ensuring the successful re-staffing of the program, the commanding officer should organize periodic events that allow reserve officers to interact with full-time staff to build camaraderie and goodwill by and between each group. This could be accomplished in group training exercises.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

- | | |
|---|---------------------|
| 1. The chief of police should meet with the officer currently charged with oversight of the reserves and any interested reserve personnel to identify ways in which the re-building of the program can be more efficient. | March 2012 |
| 2. Where processes and procedures could be changed to ensure a more effective re-build of the program, those processes and procedures should be formally revised. | April – May
2012 |
| 3. The newly revised processes and procedures regarding the management of the reserve program should be implemented. | June 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources. However, there is a potential cost savings in that an effective re-build of the reserve program could reduce the need for overtime usage or additional hiring, where reserve officers could otherwise be deployed, if available.

RECOMMENDATION 5-15:

The department should designate a computer/office for the reserve unit.

Reserve personnel have stated that report writing takes an inordinate amount of time. The reasons cited for this are both the amount of paperwork required and the lack of a designated computer at the station. As a result, reserve officers are often forced to wait until a computer becomes available to complete their paperwork and end their shift.

Because the reserve officers' time is voluntary, every effort should be made to ensure that their donated time is maximized and they are not forced to commit additional time waiting for full-time paid officers to perform the requirements of their job. The provision of a dedicated computer and/or office would help to send a message that their volunteered time is appreciated and valued.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

- | | |
|--|--------------------|
| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with command staff, should identify an area that is available for full-time access by the reserve program. | March 2012 |
| 2. Once identified, to the extent necessary, the proper equipment should be procured and installed. | April –May
2012 |
| 3. Formal policy regarding the dedicated reserve area should be implemented. | June 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

Barring the need for additional equipment, this recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources. However, should additional equipment be necessary, it would be the cost of an additional computer and any ancillary office equipment, including phone, stapler, and such.

FINDING

There is currently no formal schedule for the reserve officers. Moreover, there is no minimum requirement for time commitment. Lastly, as noted previously, the officers are allowed to act as fully commissioned officers; therefore, the reserve officers ride without supervision by a full-time, commissioned officer.

There are minimal requirements by Washington state law concerning the supervision or scheduling of reserve officers. The decision on how to address this is left to individual jurisdictions and Sunnyside's approach is not inconsistent with many Washington jurisdictions. Moreover, the lack of schedule is largely driven by the guild's and union's desire to ensure that a full-time commissioned officer's opportunity to work (including overtime) is not supplanted by the ability and availability of a reserve officer.

RECOMMENDATION 5-16:

SSPD should implement a formal schedule to allow for the most efficient use of their resources. The schedule would help ensure a reserve officer works a minimum number of hours and the resource of the reserves is used in such a way as to decrease the department's overall need for overtime.

Although the unit has dwindled in numbers recently, historically, SSPD has enjoyed a strong, active reserve unit. The individuals serving in this capacity are a well-trained resource to the department. The recent spate of crime in the community has caused for an increase in the use of overtime. Moreover, the reserve unit is attempting to build its participation through the active recruitment of new reserve officer. As such, the department should seize the opportunity to augment its current scheduling practices of reserve officer to ensure full utilization and decrease the overall need for overtime.

There is currently no formal schedule for officers, nor is there anybody actively monitoring the amount of time each reserve officer works on a monthly basis. Not only does this provide for potential liability for those reserve officers that fail to maintain their skills and abilities as a law enforcement officer, but it often leads to confusion amongst the reserve officers. Although some reported a regular

shift for which they worked, others reported sporadic participation, which led to uncertainty as to whether there would be the appropriate equipment available to them upon reporting for duty.

By creating a formal schedule, reserve officers would operate and perform the functions of their position in a more orderly fashion. In addition, a schedule would allow a closer monitoring of those reserve officers who were exercising their training regularly, so as to avoid potential liability born of an inadequately trained reserve officer. A formal schedule also would allow the department to supplement its full-time force with reserve officer to reduce the overall need for overtime during critical times. Lastly, a formal schedule would likely go a long way toward fermenting a sense of camaraderie among the newer reserve officers.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

- | | |
|--|-----------------------|
| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with the commanding officer of the reserve program, should establish a process by which reserve officers are formally scheduled. | March - April
2012 |
| 2. Once identified, the process for scheduling reserve officers should be implemented. | May 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources. However, there is a potential cost savings in that by maximizing the use of its reserve officers, the need for additional full-time officers would be reduced, where reserve officers could otherwise be deployed, if available. In addition, a formal schedule would ensure that the reserve officers are current on all appropriate job requirements, therefore reducing the city's exposure to liability.

6 DETENTION

This chapter reviews only certain aspects of the Sunnyside city jail. It is intended to cover major issues that deal mainly with staffing and revenue, and is not intended to be a comprehensive operational review or audit of the jail.

Corrections Facility Physical Plant Design and Condition

Background

The Sunnyside Police Department Corrections Facility (Sunnyside jail) is located in the Sunnyside Law and Justice Center at 401 Homer Street. The jail is a 97-bed facility designed to hold short- and long-term adult inmates. In addition to Sunnyside's own inmates, it houses prisoners from other jurisdictions, including the federal government, on a contract basis. The facility houses a combination of pre-trial and sentenced detainees/inmates, male and female, and contract inmates, most of which are from the U.S. Marshal Service (USMS), although the city is also housing inmates from Ellensburg, Mabton, and Granger on a contract basis and other jurisdictions as needed. In addition to the cells and beds in the housing area, there are numerous individual and group holding cells.

The Law and Justice Center was built in 1997. In addition to the main cell-housing areas and holding cells, there is a kitchen with cold and dry storage areas, a control center/room, visitation area, outdoor recreation area, sleeping area of trusty inmates from Yakima County Sheriff's Office, an intake/booking area, and storage space. There are four large (14 or 16 person) housing pods with secure two-bed cells, two smaller housing pod with cells or dormitory housing areas along with some holding and safety housing cells. Cells and hallways are monitored continually via direct observation from the control center and video surveillance cameras installed throughout the facility. Police officers access the jail through a vehicle sally port that opens up into the intake/booking area where prisoners are processed. There is also access to the jail from the reception area in the Law and Justice Center reception area and police department.

A major feature of the facility is its proximity to court, which is in the same building and only a few yards away from the detention housing area. Jail staff process approximately 3,000 offenders at the facility each year. In addition to the contract inmates, the facility houses City of Sunnyside offenders awaiting their first appearance before a judge, who are generally held no more than one night prior to release or transfer to the Yakima County Jail depending on the crime alleged to have been committed. In addition, the jail may hold some of the city's own sentenced individuals for full-time or part-time sentences. Like in many smaller jails there are no medical services or programs provided for those being detained.

The booking area has individual holding cells and group holding cells, desks for arresting officers to complete their interviews, reports, and the associated arrest documentation, and a workstation for detention personnel to complete the intake process and documentation. Once processed, arrested individuals are placed in an appropriate cell or dorm, based on several criteria including, gender, physical condition, and self-reported or observed gang affiliation. Juvenile offenders may be brought by law enforcement officers to the facility, but they are quickly transported to a juvenile facility. As needed, corrections staff escort detainees to court facilities in the same building. Some inmates are placed in a department or other agency vehicle to be transported to Yakima County or other jurisdictions as needed. Communities in Yakima County and the Yakima County Sheriff's Office work together so that transportation function only has to be conducted by staff from each jurisdiction one day per week, although Sunnyside correctional officer will drive to certain contract communities to pick up inmates for housing in Sunnyside jail as needed.

One of the goals of the review was to develop an understanding of the critical workload and policy issues driving staff deployment patterns and usage of overtime at the jail. We accomplished this through a comprehensive information-gathering process that used three specific approaches: document review, staff interviews, and observation during on-site visits.

- **Document Reviews.** Applicable local policies and procedures, labor contracts, payroll sheets, as well as documentation identifying both current and past staffing patterns were reviewed. We also looked at USMS standards to help ensure the facility is meeting its contractual obligations.

- **Staff Interviews.** For a better understanding of the data collected, we interviewed key stakeholders familiar with the operations of the jail. Our purpose in the interviews was to gain a more in-depth understanding of the policy, management, and operational issues faced by the staff at the facility and data that had been collected.
- **Observation.** The project team reviewed staff assignments during various shifts. The review included multiple tours of the jail and control room and observation of personnel working assignments, jail activities in the control room, housing area, intake, kitchen, and other areas.

In conducting the review the following criteria was used:

- A staff assignment or post, as described in industry vernacular, should be established in accordance with the goals of establishing and maintaining effective security;
- Posts should be staffed by a security employee in the course of normal operations;
- Staff comes into regular contact with inmates;
- Assignment practices should be flexible enough to deploy staff as needed to respond to changing needs within a jail while maintaining specific post security responsibility;
- Overtime utilization should be held to the minimal level required to perform critical operational functions;
- Jail command structures should provide appropriate supervisory coverage;
- Staff deployment is consistent with detainee classification and placement practices;
- Assigned staff responsibilities are regular, documented and well-defined; and
- National jail standards are considered when reviewing current practices.

FINDINGS

The facility is maintained in relatively good condition, although at certain times of the day some passage ways and other areas get rather cluttered and appear less than optimally organized. The control room is properly sized and organized well for the multitude of functions that are carried out within its windows and walls. The only major deficiency noted was with the video equipment used for monitoring areas in the jail and the other parts of the building and its perimeter. Many images were fuzzy, and it is difficult to detect what was happening and who was on the screen.

COMMENDATION 6-1:

The jail facility is well maintained and organized and it is able to serve the city for many more years.

As noted above, the jail facility is, by all appearances, in good shape. The department has done a good job maintaining the jail and keeping it well organized. Given its use, and the propensity for such facilities to undergo a great deal of wear and tear, the department is commended on its upkeep.

RECOMMENDATION 6-1:

The video surveillance equipment and system should be assessed and upgraded to enhance jail security and inmate, visitor, and staff safety throughout the facility.

To ensure the safety of both the employees and inmates, the video surveillance equipment should be upgraded. As noted above, the images were grainy making it hard for the consultants to clearly see the images on the monitors. Because video surveillance is imperative to maintaining the safety of both its employees and the inmates, it is important that the system be in top operating condition.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the jail sergeant, should review existing video surveillance equipment. March/April
2012
2. If it is determined that a new system is necessary, a RFP should be issued, a vendor identified, and a new video surveillance system deployed. May – November
2012

FISCAL IMPACT

The review of current video surveillance equipment and the issuance of an RFP can be accomplished with existing resources; however, the purchase of a new system will require the negotiated cost of purchasing and installing a new video surveillance system, which cannot be determined at this time.

Corrections Operations


Description of Operations

The Sunnyside jail is a 24-hour “indirect supervision” jail where personnel are assigned to perform multiple tasks to meet the operational needs of the facility. Security personnel are primarily responsible for the following: processing a diverse group of inmates through intake and release; maintaining custody and control of inmates assigned to the jail; providing inmate transport when necessary; ensuring inmates receive their recreational and other out of cell time; giving inmates prescribed medications on a regular schedule several times each day; escorting inmates to court and visitation; ensuring inmates are fed; ensuring building security is maintained and delivering services in accordance with established jail policies and procedures. These ongoing responsibilities are often required to be completed when there is

only one correctional officer on-site. As a result, assigned personnel often have to choose among competing responsibilities and prioritize or conduct multiple tasks at one time.

The city jail contains a control room strategically located in an area where visual observation can be made into the surrounding housing pods. Generally three of the surrounding pods are used to house male inmates from the United States Marshal Service, although other inmates may be placed in those pods, one pod is used to house local male inmates unless inmate management issues indicate certain inmates should not be housed with one another and one of two other pods is used to house female inmates. Access to the pods is gained through doors which can be opened by key or by control panel located in the control room that is interfaced with a door control system. The control room is staffed by one civilian dispatcher (communications officer). In addition to the surrounding housing pods, there is a housing area where a cadre of inmates (trustees) from the county is assigned to work and reside. This area can be observed remotely by staff through a security surveillance system or by personnel visiting the housing area. Constant direct visual observation is not possible in this area based on the location of the housing area and the number of staff currently available.

**EXHIBIT 6-1
Communications/Corrections Division
Organization Chart**



Source: Sunnyside Police Department Jail, October 2011.

Jail Staffing

Authorized Positions and Responsibility

The Sunnyside Police Department (SSPD) corrections facility (city jail) is staffed on a 24/7 basis by SSPD employees. The Communications/Corrections division is under the direction of the Sunnyside chief of police and deputy chief and is supervised by a communications/corrections sergeant. The division is staffed with one administrative corrections officer position, two corporals and four corrections officer

(CO) positions. A large portion of operating the jail is the responsibility of communications officers (dispatchers). There are four dispatchers. The team of corrections supervisor, corrections officers, and dispatchers is charged with the day-to-day operations of the facility and providing transportation services.

The current authorized number of staff positions approved to operate the Sunnyside city jail is 12. This staffing compliment consists of eight security and four civilian personnel. **Exhibit 6-2** identifies the current authorized staffing level by position classification.

EXHIBIT 6-2
Sunnyside City Jail
Authorized and Actual Staffing Level by Position

Position	Authorized	Actual
Security		
Sergeant	1	1
Corporal	2	2
Officers (one is Admin. Officer)	5	5
Civilian		
Communications Officer (civilian)	4	4
Total	12	12

Source: Sunnyside Police Department, 2011.

The corrections sergeant position is a dedicated supervisory position responsible for the on-site operation of the jail. The sergeant works four 10-hour shifts per week and his position is not covered when he is on sick, vacation or other leave or is otherwise away from the jail. The corrections sergeant is supported by two staff assigned as corporals who act as lead officers and provide direction and support to the five assigned corrections officers and dispatchers. One of the five corrections officers is assigned as an administrative officer. Corporals and corrections officers, with the exception of the administration officer, work 12-hour shifts with four consecutive days on duty and four off duty. The administrative corrections officer, whose duties include setting outside medical appointments, providing transport duties as needed, running jail commissary program, and other administrative functions, generally works four 10-hour shifts with same days off as the sergeant, but can be assigned to work a 12-hour corrections officer shift, if needed. Corporals cover one 12-hour shift per day 8:00 A.M. to 8:00 P.M. daily, while officers cover 24 hours per day while working 6:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. and 6:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M.

Security personnel are primarily responsible for supervising and/or performing all jail activities including: receiving, booking, releasing, classifying, maintaining custody, transporting, and providing other services to inmates in accordance with established jail policies and procedures. Specific responsibilities may include conducting initial inmate health screenings upon intake to ensure an arrestee is not a health risk if placed in the jail and needs medical attention before becoming the responsibility of jail staff, searching and recording inmate property, conducting physical inmate counts on a periodic basis (at least three times per day), personally observing special management inmates at least every 30 minutes and conducting physical plant inspections as described in both federal and national jail standards (Federal Performance-Based Detention Standards and American Correctional Association Jail Standards). The state of Washington has no published jail standards. However, because USMS inmates are housed in the Sunnyside facility, it is required to meet those standards in order to maintain compliance with contract obligations.

The corporals serve as watch commanders to provide supervision for day to day operations. Recently one corporal was put in charge of dispatch staff to give them one person to go to for administrative and other support. Dispatch includes four dedicated Sunnyside Police Department dispatchers operating on two 12-hour shifts. Because dispatch is co-located in the security control booth of the jail, dispatchers also act as the “eyes and ears” for corrections officers and manage access. Dispatchers are non-sworn personnel and members of the Teamsters Local 716. In addition to duties previously described, dispatchers are responsible for answering and recording emergency and non-emergency telephone calls; processing court, police, and city paperwork; monitoring and controlling jail and building access doors; observing surveillance video monitors; monitoring the city alarm system, and providing back-up observation of inmate and staff activity. The observation of inmates is considered one of many responsibilities for staff assigned to the control room and is often times considered a secondary responsibility especially when emergency calls are received and police officers are in need of information as they are being dispatched to handle emergency calls.

Because corrections officers have dual responsibilities for jail security and for relieving dispatchers on breaks and as needed for entire shifts, they are cross trained in both functions. Cross training correctional officers for communications duties reduces reliance on overtime and if overtime is used, reducing the reliance on the same person for several shifts in a short period. Recently, three of the four dispatchers were on leave and their shifts had to be covered by correctional officers and the other dispatcher. If staff were not cross trained, only one dispatcher would have been available and the situation would have been chaotic.

COMMENDATION 6-2:

Cross training of new staff is an excellent program, which, based on overtime data reviewed, has resulted in a reduced reliance on overtime and in spreading overtime over more staff, which should help minimize work related fatigue caused by too many hours worked without sufficient rest periods.

Current Staffing Practice

Based on the 24-hour operation of the jail, the 12 assigned personnel are scheduled to various shifts and days to ensure continuous staff coverage. Security personnel at the Sunnyside jail are assigned to one of two primary work schedules; the 12-hour or 4/10 work schedule and civilian personnel are assigned to a modified 12-hour work schedule as described in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

- *12-hour work schedule.* The 12-hour work schedule requires security staff scheduled to work four consecutive days followed by four days off in an 8-day work period. This schedule allows staff to be scheduled at a straight time rate as determined by the Fair Labor Standards Act (7k) exemption even when assigned to work more than 40 hours per week. All security personnel assigned to the jail are scheduled to a 12-hour work schedule with the exception of the corrections sergeant.
- *4/10 work schedule.* The 4/10 work schedule requires staff to work four consecutive days in a seven day work period for a total of 40 hours. Personnel are scheduled to work a ten hour day, four days per week, for a total of 40 hours per week. The corrections sergeant is the only staff member scheduled to work a 4/10 work schedule. As a result of the work schedule, the sergeant is scheduled off Friday, Saturday, and Sunday of each week. The administrative officer works the same schedule and same days off as the sergeant
- *Modified 12-hour work schedule.* The modified 12-hour work schedule allows civilian staff to be scheduled to four consecutive twelve hour days, which includes a one-hour unpaid lunch period per day and two short breaks. The civilian personnel assigned to the control room are paid for 11 hours each day. Corrections officers assigned to the jail are required to back-fill the control room posts during the employees lunch and break periods and during any short-term absence.

Based on the limited number of staff assigned to the jail, the 24-hour operation of the facility and the existing post responsibilities, the number of staff scheduled is often at or below two correctional officers, which we consider the minimum staffing requirements at least during most hours of the day. *Approximately 47.6 percent of the time there is only one security staff member on-site.* In addition, the eight security staff members assigned to this area earn and receive benefit time for sick, vacation and other leave. On average this amounts to 15.2 percent of their paid time. Therefore, this 47.6 percent figure is even larger when benefit time is considered given that not all shifts are (or need to be) covered by overtime. This figure is based on assuming the fifth officer (the administrative officer) works the 8:00 A.M. - 6:00 P.M. shift four days per week and each corporal works from 8:00 A.M. to 8:00 P.M. alternating four-day periods. Because on average correctional officers are off more than 27 shifts per year for vacation sick and other leave time, the fifth officer (administrative officer) is often used to cover another officer's time off.

**EXHIBIT 6-3
Sunnyside Jail Staffing
Current Number of Security Staff Scheduled by Day and Hour**

Current Number of Security Staff Scheduled by Day and Hour 24 – Day Period																								
Hours	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T
0600-0700	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
0700-0800	1	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	3	3	3	3	1	1	1	3	3
0800-1700	2	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	4	4	4	4	2	2	2	4	4
1700-1800	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1800-2000	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
2000-0600	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

- Sergeant: 4 x 10 Monday – Thursday (0800-1800)
- Administrative Officer: 4 x 10 Monday – Thursday (0800-1800)
- (2) Corporals: 4-4-4-4 12-hour shift alternating days (0800 – 2000)
- (2) Officers: 4-4-4-4 12 hr. shift alternating days (0600-1800)
- (2) Officers: 4-4-4-4 12 hr. shift alternating days (1800-0600)
- 11 hours each day there is only one corrections officer assigned. (45.8 percent of a day)
- 3 days per week from 0700-0800 there is only one corrections officer assigned.
- 47.6 percent of the time one security officer is scheduled.

In view of the fact the jail houses USMS inmates, additional conditions are required to be met by the jail. *USMS Policy Directive 9.2 Prisoner Detention and Housing section B.* cites the following conditions:

- Staff is on duty 24 hours a day to supervise prisoners
- Three adequate meals a day are provided to prisoners
- Adequate emergency medical coverage is available 24 hours a day
- Adequate fire and other emergency plans and procedures are followed
- There is adequate security
- Adequate sanitation and hygiene services are available
- An adequate suicide prevention policy is in place
- There is adequate access to prescription drugs

RECOMMENDATION 6-2:

For both employee and inmate safety, it is critical that the jail is properly staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

It is critical to ensure that adequate security is available at all times and staff is on duty 24 hours a day to supervise inmates. The availability of one security staff member on-site for over 47 percent of the time and the existing post responsibilities, which include intake processing and transport among other responsibilities make it difficult to ensure adequate security is provided on a consistent basis. This situation creates potential liability for the city. It was indicated that an escape, although determined to be due a facility problem, happened several years ago.

FINDING

The medical screening instrument, which is available in the Spillman jail management system, is not being used. Correctional officers appear to undertake a brief visual inspection and then carry-on with intake of the inmate. If there is an obvious problem that requires medical attention, an inmate will not be admitted until he or she has seen a medical professional. This same observation was noted for the risk assessment / classification instrument. It does not appear that inmates are being formally classified other than noting gang allegiance, if any. ACA standards for detention facilities state “before a reassignment from intake and short-term holding, there is an initial classification of the inmate that considers safety and security issues.”¹ Just noting gang affiliation and placing in certain housing unit is not a classification system.

All law enforcement jurisdictions within Yakima County are being converted to one records management/inmate management system provided by a nationally recognized provider of such systems, Spillman. The implementation of many modules, especially those dealing with jail operations, has been delayed for many months and appears to not be a priority.

RECOMMENDATION 6-3:

Policies and procedures should be revised to require a full inmate medical screening and initial classification on a regular basis within a fully functional inmate management system.

¹ Performance-Based Standards for Adult Local Detention Facilities, American Correctional Association, June 2004, page 21.

Inmate health screenings are required by National Jail Standards. The USMS policy directive on *Prisoner Health, 9.4 under Prisoner Health Care B.* cites in part as the authority standards set by the American Correctional Association. ACA standard 4-ALDF-4C-22 states that intake medical screening for inmates commences upon the inmate’s arrival at the facility and is performed by a health-trained or qualified health care professional. Inmate health screenings are not being consistently completed upon intake other the quick visual observation and asking the inmate few questions to see if they have problems.

If the reason for this not being done is the incomplete installation of the jail management system, the process should still be conducted and the documentation should still be completed and maintained manually. The city should encourage the county to evaluate the prioritization of features of the system to get a functioning RMS/IMS in place soon, especially those modules related to inmate and staff safety and security.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with the jail sergeant, should review current policies and procedures regarding medical screening and inmate classification. | March 2012 |
| 2. A process for proper medical screening and inmate classification should be developed and implemented. | April – May
2012 |
| 3. The chief of police should work with Yakima County officials to ensure the timely deployment of the jail management system; however, until such is achieved, the medical screening and inmate classification should be accomplished manually. | May 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

Aside from any cost already necessary to obtain the new jail management system being developed by the county and appropriate training of corrections officers to perform inmate medical screening, this recommendation can be implemented with existing resources.

FINDING

According to the Sunnyside police department policy manual, the policy of the city is to “avoid the need for overtime work” and “authorized overtime is to be kept to a minimum.” Based on a review of 2010 and year to date 2011 payroll data, the jail does a relatively good job of minimizing and monitoring

overtime, especially compared with the amount of overtime earned in other areas of the department. Given the limited number of staff assigned to the jail this is no small achievement.

Through July 2011, the jail has incurred overtime at a rate of 6.5 percent of regular salary for all correctional staffing including the sergeant. This compares quite favorable to the police side of the department, where, through July, overtime was running at 23.5 percent of regular salary. For 2010, this figure (overtime pay as a percent of salary) for corrections was 9.4 percent and for police was 26.8 percent. This indicates two things: (1) when comparing 2011 to 2010 figures, the jail management and operational team use of overtime through July 2011 is at 69 percent of its overtime for the entire year of 2010 overtime figures, while police's use of overtime through July 2011 was approximately 88 percent of its 2010 full-year overtime, and (2) jail operations, when compared to police operations, continues to rely on overtime less frequently.

Because dispatch works so closely with corrections officers and are supervised by the corrections sergeant, similar comparisons for dispatchers are provided. In 2010, overtime pay as a percent of regular salary averaged 20 percent and for the first seven months of 2011 stood at 18.6 percent. Although overtime is down somewhat this year, it is not conclusive that the year will end lower than the previous because there could be seasonal variations that could minimize any year to date differences. This caveat applies to security personnel as well. Nevertheless, overtime is obviously an issue for dispatchers based on the fact there are only four personnel assigned to cover four 12-hour shifts in the 8-day work period. There is simply no relief personnel, so this mission critical function relies on overtime and on security personnel to back fill when staff are on vacation, sick leave, or other work related absences.

Additionally, because dispatchers are civilian staff and not classified as law enforcement personnel, they are not covered by the FLSA 7(k) exemption and therefore are subject to overtime time or compensatory time (comp time) earned at the time and a half rate based on a 40 hour /7-day work week, despite working an 8-day work cycle. This creates numerous issues related to time accounting. This is all handled by the city's payroll system which tracks time in terms of comp time earned and comp time booked based on the hours worked in each 7-day period. All issues are covered in the support staff labor

agreement between the city and the Teamsters, but nevertheless can be challenging when accounting for pay, overtime, scheduling, and equity.

COMMENDATION 6-3:

Jail management and staff are commended on reducing reliance on overtime and maintain critical operational performance with arguably very few staff while using overtime sparingly.

FINDING

Although overtime has been kept to a minimum, staffing in the jail is problematic. Approximately 47 percent of the time only one corrections officer is assigned to the jail to meet all of the responsibilities typically assigned to a corrections officer. There is only one corrections officer scheduled to be on-site from 8:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M. each day. When assigned personnel are unavailable to fill the post, overtime expenditures or compensatory time is accrued. Both of these at a rate of 1.5 times regular pay. Each corrections officer earns and takes leave-time throughout the year. Based on a review of payroll data, on average corrections staff are not available for assignment because they are taking sick, vacation, comp, or other leave for an average of 6.9 weeks (8-day periods) per year. If a relief factor were to be calculated, it would indicate at least one additional staff position should be available to cover only the vacant shifts created by vacation and other leave. Many of these shifts are now covered by the use of overtime.

Lastly, corrections officers are used to provide inmate transport resulting in the jail operating at or below optimal staffing requirements. Officers on occasion are required to provide inmate transport, such as weekly county-wide prisoner transport duties, picking up inmates for contracted jurisdictions, and occasionally assisting police officers at crime scenes resulting in less than adequate security at the jail.

RECOMMENDATIONS 6-4:

Based on existing security post responsibilities, one additional corrections officer position should be added to ensure that a minimum of two security personnel are scheduled nearly all the time.

Although one additional officer won't quite make up the difference, it will minimize the number of hours in which only one officer is on duty and minimize the necessary overtime to cover staff corrections officers who are out on leave. In addition to adding a second set of dedicated eyes and ears in the jail, an additional corrections officer would provide a level of oversight and protection when transport, intake responsibilities, or back-fill for dispatchers requires the attention of the other corrections officer.

There are no routine daily activities scheduled between 2:00 A.M. and 6:00 A.M. Although the county inmates may be getting ready to help prepare and serve the breakfast meal and may start taking showers around 4:30 A.M., little else is typically happening. Therefore, only one officer is required between 2:00 A.M. and 6:00 A.M. while still maintaining a safe and secure level of operation. However, a minimum of two corrections officers should be on duty at all other times.

If a second post is established, it could be a non-mandatory post, which means overtime would not be required but could be recommended based on the day of the week, time of the day and other circumstances such as inmate population or anticipated law enforcement activities in the area. Otherwise, it seems as though the day shift is personnel heavy; therefore, in lieu of adding an extra position to the current roster, one of the additional positions currently assigned to the day shift could be assigned to a second shift that allows for two corrections officers between the hours of 6:00 P.M. and 2:00 A.M.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

- | | |
|---|---------------------|
| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with the deputy chief and the jail sergeant, should identify the potential for moving one of its daytime corrections officers to the night shift. | March 2012 |
| 2. If there are no existing personnel available for an additional corrections officer on the night shift, the chief of police, in consultation with his jail sergeant, should identify an outside candidate and hire him/her. | April – May
2012 |
| 3. The newly hired candidate should be properly trained on his/her duties, including any additional responsibilities that may arise from implementation of other recommendations found in this report. | June 2012 |
| 4. Additional correctional officer should be deployed to provide an appropriate level of support for the night shift of the jail. | July 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources, provided there are available personnel currently employed on dayshift. If this is found not to be case, the cost of this recommendation would be that of an additional corrections officer (\$38,590), plus benefits (30%).

The total fiscal impact from this recommendation would be approximately \$50,200 per year.

FINDING

There are a total of four communication officers assigned to the jail to provide 24 hour-a-day, seven-days a week coverage. Each staff member is provided a one hour unpaid lunch and two 20 minute breaks per day. In addition, staff are provided leave-time throughout the year. There are no additional dispatch positions available to back-fill during long-term absences or to provide temporary relief. A corrections officer is pulled from their post to back-fill the control room post during lunch and breaks and frequently must be used to cover partial or entire shifts.

RECOMMENDATION 6-5:

An additional dispatcher should be hired and assigned to a floater shift to allow relief post coverage in the control room during scheduled long-term absences of existing dispatch personnel.

An insufficient number of dispatchers are assigned to the jail to provide continuous coverage in the control room and perform the other functions required of the dispatch personnel. Because new correctional officers are being cross-trained for dispatch duties, the filling of this position, although important from a security and efficiency standpoint, may not be as critical if an additional corrections position is hired. It was obvious to the consultant and to the dispatchers and officers interviewed that correctional officers were not as proficient and efficient when performing dispatch duties, but they will get better over time.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with the deputy chief and the jail sergeant, should identify the potential for moving one of its daytime dispatchers to the night shift. | March 2012 |
| 2. If there are no existing personnel available for additional dispatchers on the night shift, the chief of police, in consultation with his jail sergeant, should identify an outside candidate and hire him/her. | April - May
2012 |
| 3. The newly hired candidate should be properly trained on his/her duties, including any additional responsibilities that may arise from implementation of other recommendations found in this report. | June 2012 |
| 4. Additional dispatcher should be deployed to provide an appropriate level of support for the night shift of the jail. | July 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources, provided there are available personnel currently employed on dayshift. If this is not the case, the cost of this recommendation would be that of an additional dispatcher (\$44,675), plus benefits (30%).

The total fiscal impact from this recommendation would be approximately \$58,100 per year.

RECOMMENDATION 6-6:

SSPD dispatchers should be cross-trained to input records and perform basic data entry for NIBRES.

Until recently, a backlog for reports and NIBRES existed. To ensure that this does not occur again, dispatchers should be cross-trained on data entry for reports and NIBRES. Many departments typically rely on their dispatchers to handle much of the workload required for records input and upkeep. Moreover, the requisite background checks and vetting has occurred with the dispatchers; therefore, SSPD dispatchers are able to perform the required functions.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

- | | |
|---|------------|
| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with the jail sergeant and data entry specialist, should identify areas in which dispatchers could be trained to assist in the entry of NIBRS data. | March 2012 |
| 2. The jail sergeant, in collaboration with the data entry specialist, would train dispatchers in the entry of NIBRS data. | April 2012 |
| 3. Once properly trained, dispatchers would be required to assist with the entry of NIBRS data. | May 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources. However, there is a potential cost savings in that by minimizing the need for patrol officers to enter NIBRS data, officers will be required to allocate less time to paperwork and more time to patrol.

RECOMMENDATION 6-7:

Ensure jail operational policies and practices are consistent with USMS standards and policy directives.

Enforce consistent compliance in all areas including providing initial intake health screenings, initial classifications, adequate facility security, and 24 hour inmate supervision in the jail.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the jail sergeant, should conduct a thorough review of its current policies and procedures. March 2012
2. Where deficient, the policies and procedures should be revised to ensure consistency with the USMS standards and policies. April - May
2012
3. The new policies and procedures should be deployed and jail personnel properly trained on such. June - July 2012

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources.

Jail Revenue

The Sunnyside jail is much larger at a capacity of near 100 inmates, for the needs of a city of about 15,000 residents. The building of excess capacity was intentional to attract jurisdictions in need of bed space that would be interested in contracting with Sunnyside to house their inmates. This strategy has paid off over the years as the jail has most of its beds filled with inmates for which the city receives revenue.

**EXHIBIT 6-4
Number of Inmates Booked
2007-2011**

Jurisdiction	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011 Estimated
Border Patrol	161	13	-	-	-
Ellensburg	-	-	-	-	38
Yakima PD	86	104	145	7	-
Other	0	0	7	15	50
Granger	14	137	114	24	4
Kittitas	120	119	63	66	-
Lynnwood	156	128	14	-	-
Mabton	237	194	118	58	94
Prosser	7	1	0	0	5
Sunnyside	2,061	1,932	1,870	2,143	2,256
US Marshals	365	492	606	557	371
Yakima DOC	302	43	5	205	1
Subtotal	3,509	3,163	2,942	3,075	2,820

Source: City of Sunnyside Police Department, October 2011.


NOTE: 2011 is estimated based on annualizing 2011 YTD data through August 2011.

FINDING

Exhibit 6-4 shows the number and source of inmates housed in the facility of the recent years. As can be observed in the exhibit, the total number of inmates booked has dropped from the high of 3,509 in 2007 to an estimated 2,820 in 2011, or about 20 percent. Reasons are many. Crime in general is down in recent years; so it would follow that inmates booked would also be down.

More noteworthy trends can be observed when one looks at Sunnyside’s own inmate figures and the inmate figures of its largest source of contract beds, the U.S. Marshal Service. The Sunnyside Police Department will have booked an estimated 195 (10 percent) more inmates in 2011 than in 2007. This is an annual average growth of 2.37 percent. The number of USMS inmates increased by 66 percent from 2007 to 2009, before returning to a near 2007 level in 2011. While the number of Sunnyside inmates has grown over the past five years, the number of inmates from most other jurisdictions as decreased significantly. Especially noteworthy is the virtual elimination of inmates from the Yakima Police Department, the Yakima County Sheriff’s Office, and cities such as Lynnwood and Kittitas. Combined, the number of Sunnyside and USMS inmates as a percent of all inmates booked, which stood at 69 percent in 2007, is now 93 percent of all inmates booked in 2011. This is shown visually in the **Exhibit 6-5**.

**EXHIBIT 6-5
Number of Inmates Booked
2007-2011**




Source: City of Sunnyside Police Department, October 2011.

NOTE: 2011 is estimated based on annualizing 2011 YTD data through August 2011.

6 Detentions

When the city contracts with other jurisdictions to house inmates, the charge is based on the number of days served times a rate per day. Typically in most jails there is a one-time booking fee and then a daily rate (per diem) to house, feed and care for an inmate. Sunnyside does not charge a booking fee. Per diem rates can range from about \$40 per day to more than \$100 in many parts of the country. The City of Sunnyside charges the Marshal Service \$60 per day. It charges the Yakima County Sheriff's Office \$79.75 for housing its inmates, which is the same rate charged to Sunnyside by Yakima. Other jurisdictions under contract are charged \$46.77 per day. The Marshal's contract and rate was established three and a half years ago and comes up for renewal next year. The number of days served can be found at **Exhibit 6-6**.

EXHIBIT 6-6
Days Served
2007-2011



Source: City of Sunnyside Police Department, October 2011.

NOTE: 2011 is estimated based on annualizing 2011 YTD data through August 2011.

The Sunnyside jail bills USMS and the cities on a monthly basis. The corrections sergeant is responsible for bed day data upon which the bills are based. These data come from the Spillman jail management system. Contract bed days are confirmed with the client and the city sends the client an invoice.

6 Detentions

More important figures and trends to observe when looking at the jail as a source of revenue for the city are the number of days the contracted inmates occupy the city's beds. **Exhibit 6-7** shows how the number of days served has changed since 2007.

EXHIBIT 6-7
Number of Inmate-Day Served
2007-2011


Jurisdiction	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011 Estimated
Border Patrol	334	44	-	-	-
Ellensburg	-	-	-	-	794
Yakima PD	1,104	1,581	2,819	161	-
Other	-	-	172	21	112
Granger	49	335	373	58	12
Kittitas	2,354	2,499	1,124	1,150	-
Lynnwood	2,525	2,104	159	-	40
Mabton	846	656	476	303	439
Prosser	59	1	-	-	4
Sunnyside	8,825	7,147	5,522	9,487	12,342
US Marshals	8,379	11,433	14,127	11,289	7,074
Yakima DOC	364	49	14	254	2
Subtotal	24,839	25,849	24,786	22,723	20,819

Source: City of Sunnyside Police Department, October 2011.

NOTE: 2011 is estimated based on annualizing 2011 YTD data through August 2011.

As noted in **Exhibit 6-7** the total number of bed days (days served) has decreased from 24,839 in 2007 to an estimated 20,819 in 2011, a decline of 16.2 percent. The number of USMS inmate bed days dropped dramatically in 2011 compared to 2008, 2009, and 2010. The number days served (which equates directly to revenue earned) has dropped by 50 percent since 2009. As indicated in **Exhibit 6-8**, the average length of stay for a Marshal inmate has decreased from 23 days in 2007 and 25.5 days in 2009 to only 19.1 days in 2011. This loss of more than 7,000 bed days per year compared to 2009 equates to a loss in revenue of more than \$423,000 compared to 2009, and more than \$252,000 since last year. Average lengths of stay are shown in **Exhibit 6-8**.

EXHIBIT 6-8
Average Lengths of Stay
2007-2011



Source: City of Sunnyside Police Department, October 2011.

NOTE: 2011 is estimated based on annualizing 2011 YTD data through August 2011.

Another interesting aspect of looking at days served, as indicated in **Exhibit 6-6**, by Sunnyside’s own inmates has risen 40 percent since 2007, from 8,825 to an estimated 12,342 in 2011. This represents an annual growth rate of 8.75 percent. So as noted in a prior paragraph, the city will have booked an estimate 10 percent more of its own inmates in 2011 than it did in 2007 (annual growth rate of 2.3 percent). So not only is the city booking more of its own citizens and others that commit crime in the city, it keeps them longer than in the past. The average days served for Sunnyside Police Department inmates has gone from 4.3 days in 2007 to 5.5 days in 2011 (**Exhibit 6-8**).

Based on the significant decline in the number of contract inmates housed and the number of days served, there is no doubt that revenues will be down. **Exhibit 6-9** shows the revenues earned by the jail of over the past five years.

EXHIBIT 6-9
Gross City of Sunnyside Jail Revenue
2007-2011

Jurisdiction	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011 Estimated
Border Patrol	13,280	1,720	-	-	-
Ellensburg	-	-	-	-	20,197
Yakima PD	42,780	63,570	119,364	6,789	-
Other	-	-	11,906	-	-
Granger	1,519	13,536	15,779	2,289	631
Kittitas	88,708	100,774	47,964	53,458	-
Lynnwood	97,656	95,477	6,746	-	-
Mabton	32,423	26,487	20,077	9,823	17,877
Prosser	2,230	40	-	-	-
US Marshals	355,160	596,560	852,540	661,470	444,870
Yakima DOC	23,478	3,705	784	19,910	-
Subtotal	\$657,235	\$901,869	\$1,075,161	\$753,738	\$483,575

Source: City of Sunnyside Police Department, October 2011.

NOTE: 2011 is estimated based on annualizing 2011 YTD data through August 2011.

Exhibit 6-9 reveals a drop in the number of jurisdiction for which Sunnyside is housing inmates on a contract basis from nine in 2007 and 2008 to four in 2011. But for the recent addition of Ellensburg inmates, the drop would have been more significant. This drop in inmates begets a significant decline in annual revenue by more than 50 percent since 2009. As is noted in the exhibit, receipts from the Marshal Service have dropped by 48 percent since 2009.

Also noted is a decrease in revenue from the USMS contract that exceeds the reduction in the number of days served. Between 2008 and 2009, the number of days served by Marshal inmates declined by 1,545 from 12,834 to 11,289 (12 percent), the annual revenue decreased by \$191,070 from \$852,540 to \$661,470 (22.4 percent). The daily rate received from the federal government increased to \$60 per day when a contract was signed in 2008. **Exhibit 6-10** shows the calculated daily rate earned by the jail based on inmate counts and bed days served and revenues earned.

EXHIBIT 6-10
Revenue Figures from United State Marshall Service
Historical and Present

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
USMS Revenue	\$355,160	\$596,560	\$852,540	\$661,470	\$508,423
USMS Days served	8,379	11,433	12,834	11,289	8,556
Average \$/day calculated	\$42.39	\$52.18	\$66.43	\$58.59	\$59.42
Actual Per Diem Rate (\$/day)		Changed to \$60.00	60.00	60.00	60.00

Source: City of Summerside Police Department, October 2011.

RECOMMENDATIONS 6-7:

The Sunnyside chief of police should establish a task force of jail and city staff and, led by the deputy chief, determine why contracts are being lost; why the average days served for contract inmates are declining; what to do to reverse those trends; and where other opportunities might be found to attract other local, state and federal agencies in need of correctional beds.

Exhibit 6-11 provides an account of the jail bed days served from 2007 to 2010. In 2007, it was costing the City of Sunnyside approximately \$10.47 per jail bed day. In response to the fiscal burden placed upon the city in 2007, the per diem rate for a U.S. Marshal inmate was negotiated upwards to \$60 per day. As a result, the jail realized a positive revenue stream in 2008 and 2009. However, again in 2010, the jail returned to a negative revenue stream of nearly 30 percent more than what was experienced in 2007. In addition to identifying other opportunities for revenue, the department should determine if the rate received from the USMS is appropriate and competitive.

EXHIBIT 6-11
Cost to Sunnyside per Jail Bed Day Served
2007 - 2010

	2007	2008	2009	2010
Total Jail Bed Days Served	24,839	25,849	24,786	22,723
Total Revenue	\$657,235	\$901,869	\$1,075,161	\$753,738
Total Expenses	\$917,292	\$891,751	\$845,732	\$1,060,946
Cost per Jail Bed Day Served (negative number indicates net positive contribution)	\$10.47	(\$0.39)	(\$9.26)	\$13.52

Source: City of Summerside Police Department, October 2011.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

- | | |
|--|------------------------|
| 1. The chief of police, in consultation with the deputy chief and city manager, should create and coordinate a task force. | March 2012 |
| 2. A thorough review of the city’s current contracts and other relevant jail data should be conducted. | April – August
2012 |
| 3. Recommendations from such a study should be presented to the council and a course of action determined to ensure the financial success of the jail. | September 2012 |

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources.

FINDING

In addition to the contract inmates, SSPD also holds offenders who have committed crimes in Sunnyside. Sunnyside’s local offender (noncontract inmates) bookings are primarily for non-index crimes, as seen in **Exhibit 6-12**. Index crimes are serious offenses that are reported to the FBI; they include murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Non-index crimes include drug and alcohol offenses, statutory offenses, and morals offenses.

EXHIBIT 6-12
Estimated Arrests as a Percent of the Number of Noncontract Booked Inmates
2007-2010

Type of Crime	Sunnyside				
	Average	2007	2008	2009	2010
Violent Index Crimes	1.2%	1.3%	1.1%	1.0%	1.3%
Property Index Crimes	10.8%	11.5%	13.0%	10.7%	7.8%
Arson Index Crimes	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%
Nonindex Crimes	88.0%	87.1%	85.8%	88.2%	90.9%

Source: City of Sunnyside Police Department, October 2011, FBI Uniform Crime Reports 2007-2010.

The FBI publishes index crime clearance rates for various sizes of cities. Sunnyside is a Group V city (10,000-24,999 residents). MGT applied the Group V clearance rates to Sunnyside’s reported index crimes to estimate the number of inmates arrested for index crimes from 2007-2010. The difference between the number of inmates booked in total and for index crimes is the number of inmates booked for non-index crimes. An example of the calculations made can be found in **Exhibit 6-13**.

EXHIBIT 6-13
Estimate of Arrests for Index Crimes in Sunnyside
2010

Sunnyside Index Crimes	# of Index Crimes	Expected Clearance Rate	Estimated Arrests	% of Noncontract Booked in 2010
# of Violent Crimes	52	53.9%	28	1.3%
Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	6	72.3%	4	0.2%
Forcible rape	7	38.3%	3	0.1%
Robbery	12	36.0%	4	0.2%
Aggravated assault	27	61.8%	17	0.8%
# of Property Crimes	724	23.0%	167	7.8%
Burglary	188	15.0%	28	1.3%
Larceny-theft	450	25.6%	115	5.4%
Motor vehicle theft	86	17.6%	15	0.7%
Arson	2	25.1%	1	0.0%
Total Index Crimes	778	25.1%	195	9.1%

Source: City of Sunnyside Police Department, October 2011, FBI Uniform Crime Reports 2010.

NOTE: The number of estimated arrests for total index crimes does not equal the sum of violent crimes, property crimes, and arson due to rounding.

RECOMMENDATION 6-8:

As part of an effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the gang elimination strategy, SSPD should periodically review non-contract bookings to see if gang crimes eventually decrease after initiatives are implemented (there is often a spike in arrests shortly after implementation of initiatives).

Since few crimes are exclusive to gang members, booking records for those arrested of suspected gang activity should be flagged soon after booking (if not during the booking process itself). Additionally, supplemental information, such as the number of people participating in the crime, evidence that the crime furthered a gang objective, and the suspect's gang status, should be kept for analytical purposes.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS:

1. The chief of police, in consultation with the jail sergeant and deputy chief, should establish a procedure by which types of arrest and number of arrest are collected and reported to command staff. March 2012
2. A regular presentation of this information should be made to help the command staff appreciate the success of their efforts. On-going

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation can be accomplished with existing resources.

7 CONCLUSION

In 2010, the City of Sunnyside experienced a spike in violent crime. The increase was most noticeable as the number of homicides jumped from a ten year average of 1.3 per year to 6 in 2010, representing a 362 percent increase. In addition to homicides, the number of reported weapons discharged was on the rise. The increase in crime rates was largely attributed to the city's escalating gang population.

To address the increasing crime rates and the growing fears amongst community members, the SSPD drafted a gang elimination strategy that was later adopted by the city council. The primary tenants of this strategy are designed to eliminate gangs, gang members, and gang associates from the City of Sunnyside. The goal of the SSPD was to tirelessly pursue the problem, only stopping when its community was rid of gang members. To accomplish this, the SSPD undertook what was termed a "counterinsurgency" approach similar to that employed in both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The primary tactic of this plan was suppression.

To accomplish this, the SSPD increased its overall budget by nearly 20 percent. By doing such, they were able to employ a crime analyst and nine new patrol officers, representing a nearly 20 percent increase in its overall personnel levels. In addition to the crime analyst and additional patrol officers, the department created a new gang unit, whose primary objective was to maintain a high visibility with known gang members, affect arrests where possible, and generally gather useful intelligence that would help the department to more accurately target crime activity.

With the addition of this many police officers, the SSPD has an opportunity to be as proactive a policing agency as any we have encountered. With patrol officers spending less than a third of their on-duty time responding to calls for service and with the addition of gang officers, this department has the resources to direct it policing efforts not only at gang issues, but also for other problem-solving activities directed at other issues faced by the community and for other proactive or community policing activities. Community policing is defined by Lee Brown, the former Houston, Texas police chief, as the building of

7 Conclusion

problem solving partnerships between the police and those they serve.¹ By using community outreach efforts and crime analysis tools, the department with its community partners can focus its resources on other issues of importance to community. Outreach efforts should include the business as well as the residential community of Sunnyside.

In the consultant's review, it is difficult to overlook the reality of Sunnyside's economic conditions. Similar to many municipalities across America, Sunnyside has been forced to reduce its overall city budget through various cuts to numerous programs. However, despite such cuts to the city budget, the police department has experienced unprecedented growth. And while MGT understands the need for some increases to the department's budget, such increases in times when the rest of the city is experiencing drastic cuts is unreasonable especially in the long term. To state it another way, while the department is currently enjoying the wide-support of the community and its council, such unfettered spending without an increased level of accountability is unsustainable.

After an extensive review, including conversations with most SSPD staff and several city employees and elected officials, MGT developed numerous recommendations to help the Sunnyside Police Department become a more efficient department, while remaining effective at reducing gang activity and crime in general. The most important component of this study is the need for the department to develop benchmarks by which the community and city leaders can measure its success. The SSPD needs to create benchmarks, measure its performance to these benchmarks, and make changes where necessary to ensure the most effective and efficient department.

As such, the department should undertake a series of actions that would help maximize the efficiency of its current staff and ensure that unnecessary expenditures are eliminated going forward; with the most important of these actions being to develop a strategic plan and include performance measures in its current gang elimination strategy. In doing such, the city and its citizens could then hold the department accountable for its increased budget and ensure that citizens' tax dollars are well spent.

¹ Lee P. Brown, "Community Policing: Its time has Come," *The Police Chief*, vol. 62, September 1991, p 10.

The need for performance measures and the resulting accountability is most important given a recent reduction in crime. As many in the city attribute the crime reduction to the increased staffing of the SSPD; recent statistics disseminated by the Federal Bureau of Investigations through its Uniform Crime Report, suggest a different story. The most recent figures suggest that despite substantial decreases in public safety budgets, nation-wide violent crime in the first half of 2011 was down 6.4 percent, compared to the same period in 2010, while the number of property crimes for the same period dropped 3.7 percent.²

Sunnyside's police department has grown in recent years. The justification for the growth is largely attributed to an increase in crime in 2010 and a plan drafted by the SSPD, which was created to reduce crime and gang activity in the area. To achieve those goals more resources were necessary. In such lean economic times, the responsibility of ensuring that the additional resources are necessary falls upon city leaders. By requiring performance measures and an increased level of accountability, Sunnyside's leadership can make accurate and responsible determinations as to adequate funding levels going forward. City leaders should hold the department accountable, require the department remain transparent to its taxpayers, and spend the hard earned tax dollars of its citizens in a prudent manner. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of city leadership to ensure that its limited resources are distributed in a fair, equitable, and thoughtful way so as to make sure no one city service or department suffers as a result of the misstated needs of another.

² FBI Sees Drop in Violent and Property Crimes, CBS News, December 19, 2011 at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57345148/fbi-sees-drop-in-violent-and-property-crimes/#ixzz1h1482TDP.